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Abstract
Emotion regulation includes adaptive (e.g., reappraisal) and non-adaptive behaviors (e.g.,
avoidance) designed to alter ones’ affective responses. The central hypothesis is that emotional
consciousness – being self-aware that you are currently in a particular emotional state – and
emotion regulation share the same underlying brain mechanisms/networks. In addition, it is
argued that the more appropriate dichotomy, in regard to non-adaptive and adaptive emotion
regulation strategies, is dependent on whether they are unconscious or conscious (respectively),
positing a two-system framework of emotion regulation. Evidence for the proposed framework
draws and builds off of recent theories of higher-order emotional consciousness (LeDoux &
Brown, 2017) and supported frameworks of fear/anxiety (LeDoux & Pine, 2016). The literature
reviewed suggests that the difference between emotional consciousness and emotion regulation
lies in the variations in recruitment of lower-order, subcortical networks and the higher-order
interpretation by the same overarching general network of cognition. In the second portion, an
empirical examination of this theory was conducted using neuroimaging and self-reported
anxiety in a sample of youth. I provide evidence for my first hypothesis by identifying significant
clusters of grey-matter thickness in the general linear analyses that qualitatively overlap with the
general network of cognition proposed to underlie emotional consciousness. The second
hypothesis was partially supported as grey-matter thickness of these regions of the PFC, but not
amygdala volume, significantly related to self-reported anxiety. Next, it is demonstrated that this
relationship was significantly moderated by youths’ structural connectivity. Post-hoc analyses
indicated that PFC grey-matter cortical thickness had a significant indirect effect on the
relationship between amygdala volume and youth’s self-reported anxiety. The current results
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provide support for the central hypothesis that emotional consciousness and emotion regulation
share many of the same underlying brain networks and mechanisms.

vii

1. Introduction
1.1. Emotion Regulation
The ability to effectively regulate emotions is essential for an individual’s well-being.
Emotions ebb and flow over time and are crucial for our survival; signaling when our attention is
needed elsewhere while facilitating the updating of goal progress (e.g., Carver & Scheier, 1990).
However, our environment (external and internal), for better or for worse, is constantly changing;
efficient and accurate updating of goal progress and emotional responses is essential for adaptive
emotion regulation (Gross, 1999). Emotion regulation refers to adaptive (e.g., reappraisal
problem solving), as well as long-term non-adaptive behavior (e.g., worry, rumination) to the
inevitable fluctuations in affective responses (see Aldao, Nolen-Hoeksema, & Schweizer, 2010).
It was once thought emotions influence behavior in an uncontrollable manner (Lyons, 1978). We
now know that many stages of emotion processing are controllable. For instance, one can divert
attention away from an emotional stimulus (e.g., Rothermund, Voss, & Wentura, 2008), reduce
the physiological consequences of the emotions he or she is feeling (e.g., Porges, 2007), and/or
cognitively reappraise a particular emotional experience (e.g., Gross, 1998). These processes are
just a few examples of effortful (or conscious) emotion regulation strategies.
The amygdala is involved in a wide range of emotional processes. Broadly, elevated
amygdala responses to emotional stimuli appear to reflect emotional intensity or arousal
regardless of whether the emotional valence is positive or negative (Anderson & Sobel, 2003;
Small et al., 2003). Amygdala activity is involved in evaluating potentially threatening stimuli
(Shin, Rauch, & Pitman, 2006), encoding emotionally salient stimuli (Canli et al., 2000),
affective recognition (Adolphs et al., 1994; Baird et al., 1999), fear conditioning (Garakani,
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Mathew, & Charney, 2006; Olsson & Phelps, 2007; Schulkin, 2006), behavioral regulation
(Dolan, 2007), and emotion regulation (Goldin et al., 2008; Ochsner et al., 2004).
Surprisingly, structural imaging studies have been inconsistent when linking amygdala
volume to various affective disorders. Some researchers have found reduced amygdala volumes
in youth with major depression (Rosso et al., 2005) but others have reported larger amygdala
volumes in the same population (MacMillan et al., 2003). Research has indicated that bipolar
youth typically display reduced amygdala volume (Blumberg et al., 2003; Pfeifer, Welge,
Strakowski, Adler, & Delbello, 2003), but more recent research suggests that this may be, at least
partially, attributed to a history of pharmacotherapy (i.e., lithium; Savitz et al., 2010). The
literature in pediatric anxiety has also been equivocal (see De Bellis et al., 2000; Milham et al.,
2005). Notably for the present study, in healthy youth amygdala volume has been found to be
negatively (Blackmon et al., 2011), as well as positively related to amygdala volume across
development (Albaugh et al., 2017). What accounts for these equivocal findings regarding
amygdala grey-matter and negative affect?
One potential explanation for the discrepant findings list above is that the amygdala
participates in emotion related processes as one element in a network of regions that also
includes top-down frontoparietal areas associated with emotion regulation. Thus, it is not the
amygdala volume alone that predicts emotional dysregulation but rather the relationship between
amygdala volume and the grey matter makeup of cortical areas associated with emotion
regulation. There is much functional evidence that frontoparietal areas are related to the
amygdala, and to emotional reactivity more generally, as a function of their involvement in
emotion regulation (Amting, Greening, & Mitchell, 2010; Greening, Osuch, Williamson, &
Mitchell, 2013; McRae, Hughes, Chopra, Gabrieli, Gross, & Ochsner, 2010).
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1.2. Aims and Purpose
Emotion regulation underlies nearly all diagnostic categories (Aldo et al., 2010), where
adaptive emotion regulation is associated with better mental health (Gross & Muñoz, 1995),
improved physical health (Sapolsky, 2007), healthier interpersonal relationships (Murray, 2005),
and better work performance (Diefendorff, Hall, Lord, & Strean, 2000). Despite its
transdiagnostic importance, and a large increase in emotion regulation research over the past
decade, there is surprising lack of continuity within the field (see Gross, 2013). The confusion in
the literature partially stems from the dubious distinction between emotion and emotion
regulation, as well as poorly integrated literatures (e.g., clinical, neuroscience, emotion
processing, and emotion regulation). For instance, it is not clear what constitutes emotion
regulation versus other forms of emotional processing (Koole, 2009), and there is even dispute
what defines an emotion (see Izard, 2007). Some view emotion generation and emotion
regulation as not being mutually exclusive (see Gross & Barrett, 2011; Ochsner et al., 2009);
experts in the field refer to the distinction as being “blurry at best” (pg. 3, Ochsner, Silvers, &
Buhle, 2012; Ochsner et al., 2009) and note it is unclear ‘‘where an emotion ends, and regulation
begins’’ (pg. 308, Davidson, 1998). This is further compounded by differences in terminology,
level of analysis, and measurement (Izard, 2007; Nigg, 2017). By definition, an emotional state
cannot last forever – every emotion one has experienced has been regulated in some way.
Despite difficulty distinguishing these constructs they are frequently modeled independently.
Broadly, the aim of the dissertation is to review the literatures on emotional processing
among various fields by providing evidence for a two-system framework of emotion regulation
that scaffolds off of two similar theories of emotional consciousness (LeDoux & Brown, 2017)
and a popular framework of fear/anxiety (LeDoux & Pine, 2016). The overall purpose of this
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dissertation is to extend these two dominate theories of emotion with the hope that it will help
integrate the fields of clinical psychology and neuroscience literatures. Utilizing neuroimaging
and reported anxiety, I examine my central theoretical hypothesis.

1.2.1. Theoretical Overview
The dissertation is divided into two portions. First, a theoretical overview is followed by
an empirical examination of this theoretical viewpoint. In the first portion, my central theoretical
hypothesis is that emotional consciousness – being self-aware that you are currently in a
particular emotional state – and emotion regulation share the same underlying brain
networks/mechanisms. In addition, it is hypothesized that when evaluating the adaptiveness of
emotion regulation strategies (i.e., non-adaptive or adaptive) the more appropriate dichotomy is
between unconscious (termed type- or level-one throughout) and conscious (termed type- or
level-two throughout) emotion regulation (respectively). Similar to theories of emotional
consciousness (LeDoux & Brown, 2017) and an empirically supported framework of fear/anxiety
(LeDoux & Pine, 2016), the differences between emotional consciousness and emotion
regulation lies in the recruitment of lower-order, subcortical networks and their interpretation by
higher-order structures. Evidence for this hypothesis will come from psychological neuroscience
literatures and allows for the easy extension of LeDoux and Pine’s (2016) two-system
framework of fear/anxiety to one of emotion regulation. The review will end by positing specific
circuits within the network as being type-one emotion regulation – often called emotion
reactivity/responsivity/sensitivity – or type-two emotion regulation (i.e., effortful strategies). It
should be noted early that the distinction made between conscious and unconscious processes is
not perfect (e.g., do you remember the specifics of your drive to work this morning? See Bargh
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& Williams, 2006); however, the conceptual distinction is important as it overlaps nicely with
(and has direct implications for) the framework and theory that will be central to the current
review. Given their intertwined nature, a framework of emotion regulation that scaffolds off
dominate theories of emotional processing (i.e., LeDoux & Brown, 2017; LeDoux & Pine, 2016)
has the potential to orient these two overlapping fields. Prior to going forward, it is important to
define the terminology used, as well as review the two-system framework of fear/anxiety
(LeDoux & Pine, 2016).

1.2.2. Empirical Support for A Two-System Framework
In the second portion of this dissertation, preliminary evidence will be provided for the
two-system framework of emotion regulation. Specifically, I first look to determine regions of
cortical thickness that are significantly associated with amygdala volume in a sample of typically
functioning youth. I go on to examine whether this relationship is moderated by youths’
structural connectivity, linking grey-matter thickness (i.e., regions that correlated amygdala
volume) and subcortical areas (i.e., amygdala volume) with self-reported anxiety. In my
exploratory analyses, a test of indirect effects was conducted. I examined whether the
relationship between amygdala volume and anxiety is indirectly related once restrictive variance
is accounted for by regions of grey-matter cortical thickness (thought to be associated with
emotion regulation). Final evidence is provided for an indirect effect, by the follow-up analyses
examining whether amygdala volume and self-reported anxiety is moderated by cortical
thickness in areas associated with emotion regulation. Given the ambiguity in the literature,
precisely defining the terminology, level of analysis, and theoretical viewpoint used throughout
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the thesis – in both the emotion and emotion regulation literatures – is essential before moving
forward.

1.2.3. Terminology
Emotion regulation is often divided into effortful, conscious, deliberate actions (termed
type-two throughout; see LeDoux & Pine, 2016; Nigg, 2017) and noneffortful, unconscious,
nondeliberate actions (termed type-one throughout). Diagnostically agnostic terms outlined by
Nigg (2017) will be used when needing to differentiate among emotion regulation: type-one
(non-effortful, unconscious, etc.) and type-two (effortful, conscious, etc.). Emotion regulation
will be defined broadly as regulatory actions used to alter ones’ behavior, physiological
responses, and/or subjective experience. This includes both type-two, conscious emotion
regulation strategies (e.g., problem-solving, cognitive reappraisal, mindfulness), as well as typeone, or unconscious emotion regulation (i.e., regulatory mechanisms that operate automatically
and outside of one’s awareness; see Bargh & Williams 2007).
Often emotional reactivity/responsivity/sensitivity (i.e., automatic behavioral and
physiological changes in response to neutral or negative stimuli) is used to refer to type-one
emotion regulation. They are identical semantically, but conceptually different. For instance, the
emotion reactivity literature tends to focus on the change in an individuals’ emotion reactivity
over development. Here, it is argued that a more helpful way to view the same phenomenon
would be to focus on the rise and changes in type-two emotion regulation (and its interaction
with type-one emotion regulation) over development.
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1.3. Two-System Neuroscience Framework of Fear (LeDoux & Pine, 2016)
LeDoux and Pine (2016) begin the journey of bridging the emotion-emotion regulation
gap with their two-system neuroscience framework of fear. The framework provides evidence
for the distinction and independence between the two threat systems. The first-system is thought
to be primarily subcortical (e.g., sensory system, amygdala, bed nucleus of the stria terminalis,
and striatum). The first-system leads to behavioral responses (i.e., the nucleus acumens
facilitating escape and avoidance behaviors; Delgado, Jou, LeDoux, & Phelps, 2009; Schlund,
Hudgins, Magee, & Dymond, 2013) and physiological changes in the brain and body – type-one,
automatic, and non-effortful, termed defensive behaviors (i.e., DFN). LeDoux and Pine (2016)
delineate specific neural correlates of the DFN, which gives rise to defensive behaviors and
physiological changes. This first-system serves as the primary source of type-one emotion
regulation, as the efficiency of the self-regulating lower-order process will determine if the
combination of sensory input becomes a subjective conscious emotional state (see Figure 1.1).
The second system is posited to be an independent, higher-order cortical system that
facilitates the subjective experience of emotion depending on the subcortical input (e.g., DFN).
Specifically, LeDoux and Pine (2016) suggest that the GNC, which gives rise to perceptual (nonemotional) conscious experience (Craig, 2009; Dehaene, Changeux, Naccache, Sackur, &
Sergent, 2006; Frith & Dolan, 1996; Frifth, Perry, & Lumer, 1999; Lau & Passingham, 2006;
Naccache, Blandin, & Dehaene, 2002; Rees & Frith, 2007), is not fundamentally different than
the network that facilitates emotionally conscious experience. The key difference is in variation
of the lower-order, subcortical input (e.g., autobiographical memory input, sensory systems,
DFN). This dissertation aims to extend the reach of the GNC to emotion regulation (see Figure
1.1).
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GNC

GNC-2 & Type-Two Emotion Regulation
Working Memory (conscious)
Emotional Self-HORORs

GNC-1 & Type-One Emotion Regulation
Working Memory (nonconscious)
HORs & Emotional-HORs
Integration of:
Memory (autobiographical and factual)
Schema (self-schema and emotion-schema)
Physiological arousal (brain and body)

Brain & Body
Responses

Amygdalae Fear
Network

Visual Cortex
(Secondary
Areas)

Long-Term
Memory
(MTL)

Figure 1.1. The two-system framework of emotion/emotion regulation. Note the difference
between an emotional, non-emotional state of consciousness, as well as conscious (i.e., type-two)
and unconscious (i.e., type-one) emotion regulation, is accounted for by the kinds of inputs
processed by the GNC. Solid lines show network interactions that are especially important in
emotional states. Underlined text indicates states/events that occur during emotional but not
nonemotional experiences. See main text for additional details. Adapted from LeDoux and
Brown’s (2017) figure.
Evidence for the independence of the two-system (e.g., DFN and GNC) framework
comes from a number of areas of research supporting the distinction between type-one
(unconscious) and type-two (conscious) emotion regulation. While the first system (e.g., DFN)
gives rise to type-one, unconscious defensive behaviors/physiological changes, the second
system is needed to interpret this subcortical input to allow for the subjective experience of fear.
Support for this notion is vast. For instance, those with amygdala damage do not demonstrate
bodily reactions to threats but still report fear (Jack & Roepstorff, 2003; Metcalfe & Terrace,
2004; Morris, Öhman, & Dolan, 1999; Overgaard, 2003; Williams et al., 2006). While healthy
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individuals demonstrate amygdala responses to threats (Hariri, Tessitore, Mattay, Fera,
Weinberger, 2002; Morris et al., 1999), those with anxiety disorders demonstrate exaggerated
amygdala activation (Mowrer, 1960; Panksep, Fuchs, & Iacobucci, 2011; Perusini & Fanselow,
2015). Moreover, fear and anxiety do not correlate well with physiological and behavioral
measures (Jack & Shallice, 2001; Frith et al., 1999; Rosenthal, 1986). It has also been repeatedly
demonstrated that subliminal threats elicit amygdala activity and trigger physiological and
behavioral responses, but not feelings of fear (Baars & Franklin, 2003; Duhaene, 2014; Hariri et
al., 2002; Jacobs & Silvanto, 2015; Kihlstrom, 1987; Morris et al., 1999; Overgaard & Sandberg,
2014). Finally, literature on patients with blind spots also support the two-system framework,
where they exhibit amygdala activation to threat, defensive behaviors, and changes in
physiology, despite not having conscious awareness of the threating stimuli (Lau & Passingham,
2006; Persaud et al., 2011). Collectively, these findings imply that the processing of threat
information by the DFN is dissociable from the conscious awareness of threat, which requires a
higher-order cortical interpretation (i.e., GNC). Importantly, it also suggests that conscious
awareness of threats occur in the same higher-order structures that conscious awareness of nonemotional stimuli do, differing on subcortical input.
Neuroscience research on conscious experience has consistently provided evidence that
the GNC is comprised of the pPL, IN, ACC, mOFC, lOFC, vlPFC, dlPFC, dmPFC, and vmPFC
cortices (see Figures 1.1 & 1.2A; LeDoux & Pine, 2016). For instance, during subliminal or
masking procedures, while areas of the visual cortex are activated, participants display activation
in the aforementioned areas of the GNC only when they report the stimulus present (Craig, 2009;
Craig, 2010; Dehaene, 2014; Dehaene et al., 2006; Frith et al., 1999; Frith & Dolan, 1996; Lau &
Passingham, 2006; Naccache et al., 2002; Rees & Frith, 2007). Similar findings come from
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blindsight patients, where the GNC is only activated when they report consciously seeing the
stimulus (Lau & Passingham, 2006; Persaud et al., 2011). Moreover, The GNC involves regions
associated with attention, working memory, and metacognition, providing theoretical support
(see, Dehaene, 2014; Dehaene et al., 2006; Del Cul, Dehaene, Reyes, Bravo, Slachevsky, 2009;
Fleming, Huijgen, & Dolan, 2012; Frith et al., 1999; Frith & Dolan, 1996; Goldman-Rakic,
1999; Lau & Passingham, 2006; Miller & Cohen, 2001; Naccache et al., 2002; Pascual-Leone &
Walsh, 2001; Rees & Frith, 2007; Vuilleumier et al., 2008).

B.

A.
Posterior
Parietal

Ins
ula

Posterior
Parietal

dlPFC

dmPFC

Insu
la
vlPFC

vlPFC
lOFC

lOFC

pIN
aIN

dmPFC

dACC

dmPFC

ACC

ACC
vmPFC

pgACC/
sgACC

vmPFC

mOFC

mOFC

Figure 1.2. (A) The structures posited to comprise the GNC, as outlined by LedDoux and Pine
(2015) and LeDoux and Brown (2016). (B) The same structures, some parcellated, to note which
areas comprise the GNC-1 or type-one, unconscious, emotion regulation (white) and those that
are part of the GNC-2 or type-two, conscious, emotion regulation (blue).
A dominant interpretation of these findings comes from the higher-order theory, which
suggests that subjective experience arises from set circuitry, which supports thoughts about
lower-order information (Cleeremans, Timmermans, & Pasquali, 2007; Cohen & Dennett, 2011;
Dehaene et al., 2006). While attention, working memory, and their underlying circuits support
consciousness, working memory can be engaged without generating conscious content (Brown,
10

2012; Carruthers, 2005; Firth & Dolan, 1996; Kouider, De Gardelle, Sackur, & Dupoux, 2010).
Thus, an additional layer of cognitive representation, likely also involving the frontal cortex, is
required beyond nonconscious representation in working memory (Cohen & Dennett, 2011).

1.4. Higher-Order Theory of Consciousness (LeDoux & Brown, 2017)
LeDoux and Brown’s (2017) higher-order theory of emotional consciousness has its
foundation in LeDoux and Pine’s (2016) framework, importantly adopting the same terminology.
It extends the two-system framework by incorporating psychological literature to posit a
modified higher-order theory of emotional consciousness. They begin with agreeing that the
underlying brain mechanisms that give rise to perceptual (non-emotional) consciousness are not
fundamentally different than those that give rise to emotional consciousness. LeDoux and Brown
(2017) go on to suggest that the subcortical regions that receive primary sensory signals from the
body (Damasio, 1999), memory systems (Squire & Zola-Morgan, 1991), and the visual system
(Van Essen, Anderson, & Felleman, 1992) are all involved in the first-order representations that
indirectly influence higher-order assembly of conscious feelings by the GNC (see Figure 1.1).
Thus, the subjective experience of fear, within this framework, is modulated by the DFN, along
with the subcortical body sensing network, memory, and visual systems, but directly arises from
other independent higher-order frontoparietal networks integrating the information (i.e., the
GNC).
Directly in line with the central hypothesis, LeDoux and Brown (2017) delineate two
GNCs: a first GNC is thought to integrate subcortical input outside of an individuals’ conscious
awareness, and a second GNC that receives this input and gives rise to the conscious experience
of fear. No specific regions, nor networks, were posited to delineate the GNC-1 and GNC-2.
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Identifying sub-networks, or circuits, that comprise the GNC-1 and GNC-2 will be central to the
current framework of emotion regulation. First, however, the differences between these
intertwined GNCs need to be reviewed.
LeDoux and Brown (2017) proposed that phenomenally conscious experiences result
from lower-order representations that originate from the GNC-1. Specifically, the GNC-1 then
creates a higher-order representation of the first-order representation outside of an individual’s
awareness, which can affect behavior (e.g., Siegel & Gallagher, 2015). The GNC-2 is then
needed to incorporate information from lower-order systems and GNC-1, leading to a higherorder representation of the first nonconscious representation that is now. The integration of this
information in GNC-2 allows for the emotional experience, and as argued here, emotion
regulation, into an individuals’ awareness.
LeDoux and colleagues (2016; 2017) argue that the GNC-1 serves as the basis for the
higher-order representation of the first-order representation produced by the visual cortex with
input from a number of subcortical regions (e.g., amygdala fear network). Actively attending to,
and a deliberate focus on, one’s emotional state (i.e., active introspection) requires an additional
higher-order representation (i.e., a higher-order representation [active introspection] of the first
higher-order representation [passive introspection], termed a higher-order representation of a
higher-order representation; now occurring within the cortical structures of GNC-2).
Furthermore, it was theorized that when the type-one, nonconscious higher-order representations
(i.e., leading to defensive fear behaviors, e.g., increased arousal), along with the higher-order
representation of the higher-order representation (i.e., being able to report fear if asked), occur
within unconscious working memory and conscious working memory, respectively (Bor & Seth,
2012; Del Cul et al., 2009; Lau & Passingham, 2007; Soto & Silvanto, 2014).
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Taken together, perceptual (non-emotional) and emotional consciousness both require the
incorporation of higher-order representation of lower, subcortical information by the GNC-2;
differences in consciousness (non-emotional and emotional) arise from the subcortical input and
higher-order representations. For instance, when the first, type-one higher-order representation
within the GNC-1 includes subcortical input about the self (e.g., through autobiographical
knowledge), the GNC-2 a self-relevant higher-order representation manifests (i.e., one is able to
report being afraid when asked). Finally, when the third higher-order representation (i.e., a
higher order representation of two previous higher-order representations) are integrated in the
GNC-2 and include subcortical input regarding schemas, autobiographical memory, input from
the DFN, and sensory networks, a similar self-relevant conscious awareness of being afraid can
occur (e.g., having the thought “I am feeling afraid right now”).

1.5. Theoretical Hypotheses
Although broad structures are mentioned, a comprehensive review of the literature
extending the theory of emotional consciousness to emotion regulation is sorely needed. The
scaffolding nature of these parallel processes makes a unifying theory, pulling from
psychological, neuroscience, and biological sciences, intuitive and potentially useful. In addition,
As shown in Figure 1.2B, the theorized neural circuits or substructures which comprise GNC-2
(and GNC-1) are not fundamentally different than those involved in type-two (and type-one)
emotion regulation. However, the regulatory strategy used will depend on the selective
recruitment of higher-order, cortical substructures that comprise the GNC, as well as subcortical
input.
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A review of the functional literature (e.g., Silvers et al., 2015; 2016) supports the notion
that the GNC-2 and type-two emotion regulation strategies heavily rely on the dlPFC, vlPFC,
and dmPFC cortices, as well as the dACC, aIN, and portions of the OFC. When reviewing the
literature, the GNC-1 and type-one emotion regulation are supported by the vmPFC, portions of
the OFC, amygdala nuclei, and pIN. Extendedly, the proposed two-system framework of
emotion regulation aims to provide evidence for specific structures and circuits within GNC that
may be related to specific type-one and type-two emotion regulation strategies.
While, some have conceptualized emotion regulation as being on a continuum; from
explicit, conscious, or effortful to implicit, unconscious, effortless, or automatic (Mauss, Bunge,
& Gross, 2007), reviews of type-one and type-two emotion regulation support the extension of
the two-system framework of fear/anxiety to type-one and type-two emotion regulation –
hypothesized as distinct, but obviously interact (e.g., changing behavior and physiology can
indirectly modulate the subjective states of fear because of the change in subcortical input; see
Gyurak, Gross, & Etkin, 2011). For example, priming individuals with an emotional goal (e.g.,
stable, restrain) leads to reduced anger after an experimental provocation, despite being outside
of participants awareness (Mauss, Cook, & Gross, 2007; Williams et al., 2006). These results
indicate that nonconscious, type-one emotion regulation, such as goal direction, can aid one in
controlling emotional states without effort or conscious awareness, which provides further
evidence for their distinction.
People engage in numerous behaviors to regulate their emotions (Parkinson & Totterdell,
1999), where it could be argued that all the behaviors one engages are simply various efforts to
regulate an emotional response. Emotion regulation can fall into four categories depending on
the goal; to decrease negative emotions (Gross, Richards, & John, 2006), increase positive
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emotions (Quoidbach, Berry, Hansenne, & Mikolajczak, 2010), increase negative emotions
(Sutton, 1991), and to decrease positive emotions (Gruber, Mauss, & Tamir, 2011). For instance,
one may suppress a laugh during a funeral (i.e., decrease positive emotions), think of a happy
memory when missing a loved one (i.e., increase positive emotions), become angry to increase
adrenaline before a sporting event (i.e., increase negative emotions), or inhibit a frown during a
date (i.e., decrease positive emotions).
Although on a continuum and not categorical, conceptualizing emotion regulation as topdown and bottom-up processes can be useful in better understanding emotion and distinguishing
the GNCs. Top-down processes are defined as being deliberate (i.e., type-two, effortful), slow,
sequential, require working memory, but limited by capacity (Nigg, 2017). In contrast, bottomup processes are automatic, stimulus-provoked, and have a quick onset (i.e., type-one, emotion
reactivity), but are posited by some to not require working memory (Nigg, 2017). While topdown processes can activate or suppresses bottom-up responses (Avital-Cohen & Tsal, 2016),
bottom-up regulation can alter behavior via priming, effecting top-down processes (Verbruggen,
McAndrew, Weidemann, Stevens & McLaren, 2016).
Importantly, cognitive reappraisal – the most commonly studied method of effortful
(type-one) emotion regulation – is often split into studies of distancing and cognitive
restructuring. A large problem in the field is that these methods are taken as being synonymous,
when there are many reasons that this should not be the case. Unlike distancing, cognitive
restructuring is central to cognitive-behavioral therapy, which is an empirically supported
treatment for anxiety and depression (see Hollon & Ponniah, 2010). While distancing – another
word for internal distraction or possibly avoidance – can reduce cognitive fixation (e.g.,
rumination) and alleviate subjective negative emotional experiencing during and directly after an
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acute, distressing situation (Gerin et al., 2006) it can be maladaptive strategy in the long-term.
For example, when participants were not allowed to ruminate (versus those that were allowed to
ruminate), they demonstrated increased physiological responses to the stressor a week later
(Glynn, Christenfeld, & Gerin, 2007). Overall, mentally processing the experience seems to
confer some long-term benefits. In contrast, cognitive restructuring is thought to create schematic
change (or changes in beliefs) that have been found to have long-term positive effects (see Clark
2013).

1.5.1. The Process Model (Gross, 1998)
The Process Model proposed by Gross (1998) is an information-processing model, where
each step in the emotion-generative process is a potential point of regulation. Five points were
identified that reflect families of emotion regulation processes: situation selection, situation,
modification, attentional deployment, cognitive change, and response modulation (Gross &
Thompson, 2007). The model is situated in time, where movement from left (situation selection)
to right (response modulation) reflect movement through time within the emotion-generative
cycle (see Figure 1.3).
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Figure 1.3. (A) Gross’ (1998) Process Model specifying the four points of emotion regulation,
with an example of emotion regulation processes at each stage. (B) Gross’ (1998) Process Model
and the complementary two-system framework of emotion regulation. All four stages, with eight
substages, of emotion/emotion regulation are outlined, with an example of emotion regulation
processes at each stage; processes in boxes represent type-one emotion regulation (i.e.,
unconscious, GNC-1) where emotion regulation strategies (i.e., type-two, GNC-2) are not boxed.
Briefly, situation selection, an individual can control the appraisal process before it ever
begins by choosing a particular context to minimize the emotional burden. Situation modification
entails attempts to directly change the situation to modify its emotional impact. The first two
emotion regulation strategies modify appraisal inputs, thus controlling the cues available to
generate specific emotions (Gross, 2001). An individual can divert their attention to
environmental cues that promote desired emotions and/or ignore cues that promote negative
emotions. Attentional deployment is important as it serves as a gate, allowing particular cues into
the reappraisal process, while making others not possible. Cognitive change includes altering the
meaning of a specific stimuli. Cognitive reappraisal, the most common form of cognitive change,
includes changing beliefs about stimuli in an effort to decrease negative and/or increase positive
emotions. Finally, response modulation only affects the behavioral output of the reappraisal
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process. Therefore, response modification, such as behavioral suppression (e.g., hiding a
grimace) or augment behavioral manifestations (e.g., slowly approach the stimulus).
Extending the process model to the higher-order theory of emotion regulation, all five
points of the emotion regulation process could be regarded as type-one or type-two regulatory
processes, depending on subcortical input (e.g., context) and higher-order connectivity (Gold,
Morey, & McCarthy, 2015). For example, an individual may consciously choose not to go to the
school dance due to fear or unconsciously avoid a particular stimulus (“I just don’t want to go”),
where both relate to subcortical and cortical activity within the same networks (i.e., DFN and
GNC). By definition, cognitive change may be an exception, as this point typically refers to typetwo emotion regulation strategies one can use in response to a current appraisal (i.e., the
byproduct of type-one emotion regulation). However, some view that cognitive reappraisal can
occur outside one’s conscious awareness (e.g., Williams et al., 2006), as one does not
consciously choose to be in denial or maybe to use humor in an uncomfortable situation, for
example. The current two-system framework of emotion regulation emphasizes the difference
between whether a particular emotion regulation strategy (of the five) is type-one or type-two.
This vantage point will be shown to be advantageous and complementary to the Process Model,
indicating the importance of a two-system framework of fear regulation (see Figure 1.3).
The Process Model also posits that different forms, or families, of emotion regulation
have different consequences, as they are deployed at different stages of the emotion-generative
process. Gross (2013) captures this idea with an illustration contrasting suppression (i.e., part of
the response modulation family, in this case type-one) and reappraisal (i.e., part of the cognitive
change family, in this case type-two). He notes that while both are commonly used to downregulate emotions, only suppression is behaviorally oriented, where an individual attempt to
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decrease emotion-related behaviors (e.g., altering your facial expression to not appear scared)
while emotionally aroused. On the other hand, reappraisal is cognitively oriented, where an
individual attempt to think about a situation to alter his/her emotional response, often termed
cognitive restructuring (see Webb, Miles & Sheeran, 2012 for a review).
Gross (2013) continues the juxtaposition between suppression and reappraisal by noting
affective, cognitive, and social differences the use of these two strategies can have. Suppression
decreases positive, but not negative emotional experiences, increased physiological response,
and greater activation in subcortical emotion-generative regions (e.g., amygdala). Conversely,
cognitive reappraisal has been shown to decrease negative emotional experiences, increase
positive emotional experiences, does not affect arousal, and leads to reduced activity in emotiongenerative regions (e.g., amygdala; see Gross & Thompson, 2007). Where suppression leads to
worse memory, reappraisal either has no effect or improves memory and performance (Jamieson,
Mendes, Blackstock, & Schmader, 2010; Richards & Gross, 2000). Socially, suppression is less
tolerated by partners and is associated with increased blood pressure, whereas reappraisal is not
associated with adverse social consequences (Butler et al., 2003).
Aldao, Nolen-Hoeksema, and Schweizer (2010) provide further support for this notion in
their meta-analysis of six emotion regulation strategies (i.e., acceptance, avoidance, problem
solving, reappraisal, rumination, and suppression) and symptoms of four psychopathologies (i.e.,
anxiety, depression, eating, and substance-related disorders). They found large effect sizes for
rumination, medium to large for avoidance, problem-solving, and suppression, and a small to
medium effect size for reappraisal and acceptance. In addition, clinical versus normative samples
significantly moderated these relationships. Given the prominence of reappraisal and acceptance
in treatment models (e.g., cognitive-behavioral therapy), their findings were surprising. In all,
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these results suggest that the presence of a maladaptive emotion regulation strategy is much more
deleterious than the absence of an adaptive emotion regulation strategy.
As mentioned, adaptive and maladaptive emotion regulation strategies are often
differentiated in the literature. For example, reappraisal, problem-solving, and acceptance are
seen as adaptive (Gross, 1998; Gratz & Roemer, 2004). In contrast, maladaptive strategies are
thought to underlie models of depression and anxiety (Beck & Clark, 1988), which led to
cognitive-behavioral therapies focus on teaching reappraisal skills (Beck, Rush, Shaw & Emery,
1979). While adaptive emotion regulation strategies tend to be type-two, whereas maladaptive
emotion regulation strategies are often type-one (do you choose to worry?), this is not always the
case. For example, type-one (unconscious) reappraisal of goals is thought to be associated with
positive outcomes (e.g., Williams et al., 2006) and type-two emotion regulation strategy of using
humor is associated with poorer outcomes (Samson & Gross, 2012). Therefore, the two-system
framework of emotion regulation explains this discrepancy (See Figure 1.4)
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Figure 1.4. (A) Gross’ (1998) Process Model specifying that it hypothesizes that emotion
regulation strategies have worse consequences over time (or over the four stages of emotion
regulation), with an example of emotion regulation processes at each stage. Gross’ (1998)
Process Model and the two-system framework of emotion regulation. All four stages and eight
substages of emotion/emotion regulation are outlined, with an example of emotion regulation
processes at each stage, and the typical consequences.
Problem-solving is a type-one, conscious (effortful) attempt to modulate a situation or
consequences; typically involving specific actions directed at solving the problem. Evidence for
problem-solving as an adaptive strategy comes from studies finding low problem-solving is
associated with many internalizing disorders (e.g., Kant, D’Zurilla, & Maydeu-Olivares, 1997)
and is a component taught during cognitive-behavioral therapy (e.g., Beck et al., 1979).
Mindfulness is a regulation strategy that involves the non-judgmental acceptance of emotions
(Bishop et al., 2004). Thus, it is conceptualized as a non-elaborative, non-judgmental, presentcentered awareness and acceptance of thoughts, feelings, and sensations (Kabat-Zinn, 2003).
High acceptance has been found to produce good outcomes (e.g., Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson,
1999), where low-levels of acceptance have long been associated with various internalizing (e.g.,
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McLaughlin, Mennin, & Farach, 2007) and personality disorders (Gratz, Rosenthal, Tull, &
Lejuez, 2006).
Maladaptive regulation strategies such as suppression and avoidance are risk factors for
anxiety, depression, and substance abuse (Carver et al., 1989; Folkman & Lazarus, 1980). While
Gross’ model (1998) emphasizes suppression of emotional expression; providing evidence of the
long-term negative outcomes (e.g., increased physiological arousal; see Gross & Thompson,
2007; John & Gross, 2004). Others have focused on cognitive suppression (Wenzlaff & Wegner,
2000), providing substantial evidence that effortful suppression of thoughts increases their
accessibility (Wegner & Erber, 1992; Wegner, Schneider, Carter, & White, 1987) and
physiological arousal (Wegner, Broome, & Blumberg, 1997).
Historically, avoidance has been conceptualized in the behavioral domain. Mowrer
(1947) posited the two-stage theory of fear, where 1) fear is learned through classical
conditioning and 2) through (behavioral) avoidance extinction cannot occur, maintaining the fear
response through operant conditioning. This model has been applied to post-traumatic stress
disorder (Foa & Kozak, 1986), panic disorder (Barlow, Craske, Cerny, & Klosko, 1989), and
specific phobia (Merckelbach, de Jong, Muris, & van den Hout, 1996). Experiential avoidance,
in contrast, is the avoidance (or suppression) of thoughts, emotions, physiological responses,
memories, and urges (Hayes et al., 1999). Hayes and colleagues proposed acceptance as the
alternative to experiential avoidance, central to the treatment they developed, acceptance and
commitment therapy (Hayes et al., 1999).
Instead of suppressing unwanted cognitions or emotions, some individuals repetitively
focus on the cause of their negative emotions, and the undesirable outcomes (i.e., rumination;
Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco, & Lyubomirsky, 2008). Similarly, worry (i.e., a repetitive focus on an
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anticipated adverse event in the future) is associated with a tendency to attempt to control and
avoid negatively evaluated internal experiences (i.e., emotion regulation; Roemer, Salters, Raffa,
& Orsillo, 2005) and with a tendency to react to emotional responses as if they are threatening
(i.e., emotional reactivity; Roemer et al., 2005; Mennin et al., 2005). Worry is hypothesized to
negatively reinforced by diminishing negative emotions and physiological arousal (Borkovec,
Alcaine, & Behar, 2004; Borkovec & Hu, 1990; Wells & Papageorgiou, 1995), and a
conditioned response activated by negative emotional states (Startup & Davey, 2001). Worry is
thought to be Clinical and subclinical populations can be differentiated on their self-reported
reason to worry, where the latter reports using this strategy to distract themselves from other
negative topics.
Both rumination and worry facilitate the avoidance of emotional processing, leading to
less adaptive functioning and increased distress. Individuals reporting chronic rumination and/or
worry state they use the strategy to solve the problem at hand, despite both being negatively
related to problems solving (Dugas, Letarte, Rhéaume, Freeston, & Ladouceur, 1995;
Papageorgiou & Wells, 2003). For instance, worry has been found to be related to problem
orientation (i.e., emotional reactivity; immediate cognitive-behavioral-affective reactions to
problematic situations) but not to problem-solving skills (i.e., adaptive emotion regulation;
creating goals, brain storming solutions, making decisions, and implementing the solutions;
Dugas et al., 1995). Unsurprisingly, rumination also interferes with good problem solving and
has been found to foster indecisiveness (Ward, Lyubomirsky, Sousa, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2003).
Taken together, it is clear that not all emotion regulation strategies are equal. When
viewing it from a two-system framework, it appears that positive outcomes are associated with
an individual being aware of the emotion regulation occurring. This would suggest that strategies
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typically viewed as maladaptive, such as rumination, are adaptive if one is aware they are
occurring, which is exactly what is found (Glynn et al., 2007). This viewpoint fits nicely with the
literature and what is observed clinically as well. The developmental process hinders children’s
ability to bring emotion regulation strategies within awareness (i.e., type-two), leaving them with
nearly only type-one emotion regulation processes. Thus, explaining the difficulties of teaching
cognitive restructuring or mindfulness to very young children, as well as their trouble reporting
and managing their internal world (see Christophersen & VanScoyoc, 2013). While research has
been able to delineate adaptive and maladaptive emotion regulation strategies, current evidence
suggests a two-system framework. Emphasizing what strategies not to use (medium to large
effect sizes) while teaching adaptive strategies (small to medium effect sizes) is certainly an
avenue of future treatment research.

1.6. The General Network of Cognition and Emotion Regulation
Neuroimaging studies of these emotion regulation strategies (e.g., Otto, Misra, Prasad, &
McRae 2014; Zilverstand, Parvaz, & Goldstein, 2017) map on to the GNC outlined by Ledoux
and Brown (2017), where the various strategies differ only on lower-order, subcortical input. As
seen in Figure 1.2A, they broadly implicate the pPL, IN, ACC, and a number of areas in the PFC
(i.e., ventral-lateral, dorsal-lateral, orbital-lateral, orbital-medial, dorsal-medial, and ventralmedial cortices). In terms of functional neuroimaging, these same regions are involved in typetwo emotion regulation strategies such as cognitive reappraisal (Zilverstand et al., 2017), active
suppression (Goldin et al., 2008; Wyland, Kelley, Macrae, Gordon, & Heatherton, 2003), as well
as type-one regulatory processes such as the initiation of defensive behaviors (e.g., Mogenson,
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Jones, & Yim, 1980), rumination (Cooney, Joormann, Eugène Dennis, & Gotlib, 2010), and
worry (Paulesu et al., 2010).
Further evidence comes from the structural (i.e., cortical thickness, subcortical volumes)
differences (and overlap) found between self-reported anxious apprehension (largely mapping on
to type-two emotion regulation strategies such as worry) and anxious arousal (capturing type-one
defensive behaviors/changes in physiology). In line with structures comprising the GNC, anxious
apprehension, but not anxious arousal, correlated with clusters in the dlPFC, dmPFC and vlPFC,
whereas anxious arousal, but not anxious apprehension, produced clusters in the aIN and the
amygdala (Castagna et al., 2017). Again, these findings are congruent with the two-system
framework of fear/anxiety (LeDoux & Pine, 2016). Interestingly, a conjunction analysis revealed
the importance of a number of frontoparietal regions with strong relationships to both systems
(Castagna et al., 2017). The overlap among the GNC and regions involved in emotion regulation,
broadly, is fairly evident; however, my aim is to extend LeDoux and Brown’s (2017) distinction
between GNC-1 and GNC-2.
Support for my hypothesis is first provided by a review of the literature on the function of
neurocognitive structures thought to comprise the GNC. It is suspected that the literature will
support neural circuits or substructures that map on to the GNC-2 (and GNC-1), and that they are
not fundamentally different than those involved in type-two (and type-one) emotion regulation.
Each structure posited by LeDoux and Pine (2016) will be reviewed to highlight their function in
emotion regulation. Evidence of their role in perceptual consciousness (Craig, 2009; Dehaene,
Changeux et al., 2006; Frith & Dolan, 1996; Frifth et al., 1999; Lau & Passingham, 2006;
Naccache et al., 2002; Rees & Frith, 2007) and emotional consciousness (LeDoux & Brown,
2017; LeDoux & Pine, 2016) has been extensively reviewed elsewhere.
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Each paragraph will pull from functional imaging studies and meta-analyses, where the
literature generally supports the notion that the GNC-2 and type-two emotion regulation
strategies heavily rely on the dlPFC), vlPFC, dmPFC cortices, as well as the dACC, aIN, and
portions of the OFC. The GNC-1 and type-one emotion regulation, in contrast, appear to be
supported by the vmPFC, portions of the OFC, amygdala nuclei, and pIN. See Figure 1.2B.

1.7. Neuroanatomy of Emotion and Emotion Regulation
1.7.1. Posterior Parietal Lobe (pPL)
When an individual is aware of a visual stimulus, PFC and pPL circuits are engaged;
however, as awareness dissipates, the circuit is no longer recruited (Block, 2007; Rees & Frith,
2007; Lau & Rosenthal, 2011; Rosenthal, 2005), which has been extended to threat awareness
(Baars & Franklin, 2003; Dehaene, 2014; Block, 2007; Jacobs & Silvanto, 2015; Kihlstrom,
1987; Morris et al., 2004; Overgaard et al., 2014). Functional imaging has consistently
implicated the pPL, vlPFC, and superior temporal as regions involved in linguistic processing
(Anderson & Phelps, 2002). These findings suggest that these regions are likely important in
higher-order emotional consciousness (i.e., GNC-2) and regulation (i.e., type-two). Evidence
supporting this claim comes from a meta-analysis where the pPL engagement was related to
cognitive reappraisal (Zilverstand et al., 2017). Furthermore, Goldin et al. (2008), found pPL
recruitment during two types of effortful (i.e., type two) emotion regulation strategies. Therefore,
it is posited that the pPL predominantly coactivated with other regions of the GNC-2.
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1.7.2. Insula (IN)
The IN is broadly associated with internal bodily sensations and interoceptive
representations that can substantialize into conscious awareness of one’s arousal (Craig, 2009).
For instance, Critchley et al. (2004) found strong activity in the IN when participants were aware
of their heart-beat, an interoceptive measure that correlates with individual subjective emotional
awareness. A posterior-anterior IN cortex distinction is important, and likely explains why
previous clinical literature has been, at times, equivocal. For instance, some find greater bilateral
activation (along with the amygdala) to emotional faces in individuals’ prone to anxiety (when
compared to anxiety-normative controls; Stein et al., 2007). Within a sample of clinically
anxious participants and healthy controls, the aIN, specifically, shows hyper-reactivity in
response to fearful faces, which also involves reduced connectivity with the lPFC (implicated in
type-two emotion regulation). A recent, comprehensive meta-analysis, however, did not find
evidence for differences in IN activity between those with social anxiety disorder and healthy
controls when viewing faces (Gentilli et al., 2016).
This discrepancy may stem from differential functions by the aIN and pIN. Interestingly,
objective, unconscious representations of internal sensations are represented linearly in the dorsal
pIN, but subjective (conscious) ratings of these interoceptive representations correlate with
activation of the aIN and the adjacent OFC (Rolls, 2015; 2016). Moreover, the pIN has been
implicated in heautoscopy (i.e., a dissociative experience of feeling as though one is in two
bodies at once; Heydrich & Blanke, 2013). In contrast, the aIN is thought to receive input from
the OFC and ACC (Price, 2006; 2007); the OFC and ACC decode and represent the reward and
punishment-related signals that can produce autonomic (visceral) responses (Rolls, 2014; 2016).
Activity in the aIN is often found in neuroimaging studies examining type-two emotion
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regulation strategies (e.g., Goldin et al., 2008). Together, this suggests that the integration of
interoceptive information may occur in a posterior-anterior pattern.
Four functional groups that comprise the IN shed light on its various functions. Kurth et
al. (2010) identified sensorimotor, cognitive, social-emotional, and an olfacto-gustatory domain
within the IN. They provided converging evidence for the current theory. The mid-posterior
regions were found to be densely connected to primary and secondary sensory and motor areas.
Therefore, it appears likely that the pIN is essential to the GNC-1, where it may integrate
subcortical information from the DFN regarding behavioral and physiological arousal. In
contrast, the anterior-dorsal regions have stronger connections with frontal regions (see
Augustine, 1996), likely indicating its importance as a substructure of the GNC-2. Further
evidence comes from literature demonstrating the robust relationship between the anterior-dorsal
regions of the IN is part of the frontoparietal network, important in language processing, as well
as working memory and attention tasks (Price, 2000). These processes directly overlap with
type-two emotion regulation strategies such as cognitive reappraisal (i.e., language processing)
and attentional deployment (i.e., attention).
Taken together, a modest hypothesis would be that the pIN provides input on internal
sensations, outside of one’s awareness (i.e., GNC-1) to the DFN (e.g., amygdala). In contrast, the
aIN is posited to be important for emotional consciousness (GNC-2), as it provides input on
arousal to higher-order cortical areas that give rise to emotional consciousness. (i.e., mPFC, aIN;
see Cardinal et al., 2002).
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1.7.3. Anterior Cingulate Cortex (ACC)
LeDoux and Pine (2017) specifically implicate the ACC as being central to the GNC. The
ACC is known to play an important, albeit broad, role in higher-order appraisals and decision
making (Bush et al., 1999; Mars et al., 2011). The function of the ACC directly maps on to typetwo emotion regulation strategies such as cognitive reappraisal. The focus will be on specific
substructures of the ACC, as various parcellations demonstrate different functions that relate to
the GNC-1 and GNC-2.
Broadly, the ACC is a limbic structure correlated with pleasantness or unpleasantness of
stimuli (Rolls, 2015). It receives strong input from the amygdala and OFC regarding value and
outcome value representations. It has strong projections to the midcingulate cortex that facilitate
action-outcome learning (Rolls, 2014). Some have suggested that the ACC mediates the
orbitofrontal cortex representations of current and future value with behaviors (Rolls, 2015;
2014).
The ACC is typically parcellated by its ventral (i.e., pgACC and sgACC) and dorsal
portions (i.e., dACC). (Etkin, Egner, & Kalisc, 2011; Vogt, Berger, & Derbyshire, 2003).
Emotion-processing regions (e.g., amygdala, hypothalamus) have strong connectivity with the
dACC and pgACC (Amaral et al., 1992; An et al., 1998; Beckmann et al., 2009; Chiba,
Kayahara, & Nakano, 2001; Ghashghaei, Hilgetag, & Barbas, 2007; Rempel-Clower & Barbas).
The dACC has the strongest connectivity with the premotor and lPFC (Bates & Goldman-Rakic,
1993; Beckman et al., 2005). Overall, the pgACC and portions of the sgACC interact with lowerorder cortical structures (i.e., DFN) indicating that they likely are important structures in the
GNC-1 and facilitate type-one emotion regulation. On the other hand, dACC communicates with
dorsal and lateral regions of the PFC important in type-two, conscious emotion regulation. It
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follows that the dACC would predominantly be involved in emotional consciousness (GNC-2)
and type-two emotion regulation. For this to be correct, functional neuroimaging studies should
find differences among the subregions of the ACC that map on to type-one (and GNC-1) and
type-two (and GNC-2). Activity in the dACC, specifically, has been correlated with fearconditioned skin conductance (Milad et al., 2007) and increased heart rate during social
evaluation (Wager et al., 2009). Moreover, direct stimulation of the dACC creates the subjective
state of fear (Meyer, McElhaney, Martin, & McGraw, 1973) – in line with the dACC being
essential to the GNC-2.
Where the dACC is associated with imminent threats, the pgACC and sgACC typically
activate during a distal threat, extinction, and recall of extinction (Etkins et al., 2011). Moreover,
a meta-analysis found that the dACC, but not the pgACC or sgACC, is consistently recruited
during type-two emotion regulation functional neuroimaging studies (Kalisch, 2009). Consistent
with this view, the pgACC and sgACC (along with the mPFC) may mediate the dorsomedial and
lPFC central to reappraisal. They may serve a similar function with the amygdala, as the
amygdala has little to no connectivity with the lPFC (Amaral et al., 1992; Kalisch, 2009).
Finally, type-one emotion regulation, which can be examined through distraction and emotion
labeling tasks, activates the pgACC, sgACC, and mPFC (Delgado et al., 2008; Lieberman et al.,
2007); hypothesized to reflect the structures’ generic inhibition of negative emotional processing
(i.e., GNC-1 or type-one emotion regulation) to the amygdala and can be recruited by higherorder regions of the GNC-2 (e.g., dACC or lPFC).
In a review of the literature, Kalisch and Gerlicher (2014) suggested similar division of
the dACC but into rostral and posterior portions. The rdACC – not the pdACC, is associated with
cognitive reappraisal, conscious worrying, and catastrophizing (i.e., type-two). Thus, the rdACC,
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more specifically, may be related to type-two emotion (i.e., GNC-2) and type-two emotion
regulation. Further evidence comes from functional connectivity studies, which indicate that the
rdACC has reciprocal connections with the pdACC (i.e., physiological processing), the
periaqueductal gray, the amygdala, and aIN (Chiba et al., 2001; Gashghaei et al., 2007; Grupe &
Nitschke, 2013). Finally, with increased connectivity between the rdACC-amygdala positively
correlates with individuals’ trait anxiety, indicating that threat appraisal processes in the rdACC
activates portions of the amygdala, alerting one to potentially threating stimuli (Etkin et al.,
2011). Collectively, the literature supports the distinction between dACC and the ventral ACC
(i.e., pgACC and sgACC), where the latter is an important component is central for type-two
emotion regulation (and GNC-2), but the former facilitates processes primarily related to typeone (and GNC-1) emotion regulation.

1.7.4. Medial-Lateral Orbitofrontal Cortex (mOFC; lOFC)
It is unsurprising that the OFC has been implicated as being a part of the GNC (LeDoux
& Pine, 2016), as it often associated with the integration of information vital for consciousness
(see LeDoux & Brown, 2017). The OFC is often divided into mOFC and lOFC portions that
have been shown to have differential functions and connectivity. Broadly, the OFC is involved in
emotion, reward valuation, and reward-related decision making, where it projects its
representations to the dACC for action-outcome learning (Rolls, 2015). The OFC has direct
connections to the amygdala, and receives input from each sensory modality (e.g., visual,
olfactory), providing “what” information (Rolls, 2015).
The mOFC has consistently been associated with taste, oral texture, olfaction stimuli, and
subjective pleasantness (Grabenhorst, Rolls, & Bilderbeck, 2007; Kringelbach & Rolls, 2004;

31

Rolls, 2004; Rolls 2015; Rolls, Kringelbach, & De Araujo, 2003; Rolls, O’Doherty, Kringelbach,
Francis, Bowtell, & McGlone, 2003). A meta-analysis (Kringelbach & Rolls, 2004) found that
the mOFC is related to contextual evaluation of stimuli and updating the meaning of emotional
stimuli as they change over time, which is essential to altering stimulus meaning during
reappraisal. As well, during gambling tasks, the monetary reward value is presented in the
mOFC, but the monetary outcome loss is presented in the lOFC (O’Doherty, Kringelbach, Rolls,
Hornak, & Andrews, 2001). However, the OFC has been conceptualized as a convergence zone
for afferents from limbic and association areas; therefore, evidence for the OFC contribution of
the GNC-1/GNC-2 and relating to both type-one and type-two emotion regulation will be
provided as well.
The lOFC activity is consistently related to the evaluation of punishers and future value
of stimuli, which can lead to a change in ongoing behavior (De Araujo et al., 2003; Rolls, 2015).
Activation of lOFC is noted when stimulus-reward mappings are changed (O'Doherty et al.,
2003). This is consistent with neuroimaging studies showing activation of lOFC and related areas
of vlPFC when participants are performing the Stroop task (Bench et al., 1993), providing
responses opposite of what is cued (Paus et al., 1993), inhibiting an attentional shift (Nobre et al.,
1999), inhibiting motor movement (Krams et al., 1998), changing entrenched responses (Taylor,
Kornblum, Minoshima, Oliver, & Koeppe, 1994), and deductive and inductive reasoning (Goel
et al., 1997).
The OFC, broadly, is associated with cognitive reappraisal (Banks et al., 2007; Goldin et
al., 2008; Ochsner et a., 2004; Etkin et al., 2011). Specifically, the connectivity between the
amygdala, OFC, and dmPFC seem to be essential to type-two emotion regulation, where the
amygdala coupling with the OFC and dmPFC significantly predicts the attenuation of an
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individual’s self-reported negative affect following cognitive reappraisal (Banks et al., 2007).
This has led some to speculate that the OFC may serve as a mediator between the lower-order
DFN (e.g., amygdala) and the higher-order cortical structures (e.g., PFC).
In line with this notion, it has been posited that the OFC with the vmPFC are implicated
in the integration of bodily signals that help decision making, termed the somatic marker
hypothesis (see Dunn, Dalgleish, & Lawrence, 2006 for a critical review). For instance, the OFC
receives information from a number of regions in the sensory cortex (e.g., Rolls, 2015).
Moreover, the OFC has inputs from somatosensory cortex, inferior temporal cortex, temporal
pole, and the visual association areas (Barbas, 1995; Morecraft, Geula, & Mesulam, 1992;
Petrides & Pandya, 1988). The amygdala has direct projections that reach the OFC (Krettek &
Price, 1977; Ray & Price, 1993). The OFC then provides input to the ACC, hypothalamus,
ventral tegmental area and caudate nucleus inferior temporal and entorhinal cortices (Nauta,
1964; Kemp & Powell, 1970; Insausti, Amaral, & Cowan, 1987). The diverse pattern of
connectivity suggests that the OFC may serve as a convergence region for afferents from both
emotion and sensory regions. A wide-range of connectivity is also consistent with either a wide
range of functions or an integrative role; therefore, it is likely to be important for both type-one
(i.e., GNC-1) and type-two (i.e., GNC-2) emotion regulation.

1.7.5. Dorsomedial and Ventral Medial Prefrontal Cortex (dmPFC; vmPFC)
The mPFC is typically parsed into the dmPFC and vmPFC, which have been found to
have differential functions. For instance, meta-analytic studies show reappraisal of negative
stimuli typically recruit the lateral and dorsomedial PFC (e.g., Banks et al., 2007). Further, the
inverse relationship between activation in the dmPFC, vlPFC, OFC, and dlPFC (but not vmPFC)
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and reduced activity in the DFN (e.g., amygdala) is frequently considered an index of cognitive
reappraisal (Banks et al., 2007; Buhle et al., 2014). Broadly, dmPFC is thought to moderate the
significance of a stimuli (i.e., salience) through the regulation of attention to sensory input
regions in the amygdala and hippocampus (Kolb, 1984) and by mediating amygdala input to the
nucleus accumbens, facilitating motivation and learning (Jackson & Moghaddam, 2001). While
dmPFC activation is consistently found during effortful emotion regulation (i.e., type-two), the
vmPFC likely serves a more domain-general role, useful for a number of various goal-directed
behaviors (see Nakamura-Palacios et al., 2016).
The inverse relationship between cortical-subcortical activity is consistent with a “topdown” model of emotion regulation that involves the dmPFC, along with domain-general
cognitive control regions: dlPFC, vlPFC, and pPL (Buhle et al., 2014; Diekhof, Geier, Falkai, &
Gruber, 2011; Kalisch 2009; Ochsner et al. 2012; Ochsner & Gross 2005, 2008; Schiller &
Delgado 2010). Again, directly mapping on to structures hypothesized to comprise the GNC-2
and type-two emotion regulation. Interestingly, electrolytic lesions of the vmPFC (but not the
dmPFC, vlPFC, nor IN cortex) interfere with type-one emotion regulation, such as freezing
(Morgan, Romanski, & LeDoux, 1993; Morgan & LeDoux, 1995); evidence that the vmPFC is
more likely important to type-one (i.e., GNC-1) emotion regulation.
The dmPFC is positively correlated with reappraisal (e.g., Buhle et al., 2014), associated
with rule-based processing, and controls motor activity through its connections with the motor
cortex, which, in turn, directs the execution of movement (Narayanan & Laubach, 2008). Using
principal component analysis to examine the neurofunctional organization of regions implicated
in reappraisal (Klumpp, Bhaumik, Kinney, & Fitzgerald, 2018), the dmPFC was found to have
the most robust factor loading. Moreover, a meta-analytic study of psychotherapy in anxiety and
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depression showed more controlled dmPFC activity following psychotherapy (Messina, Sambin,
Palmieri, & Viviani, 2013; Messina, Sambin, Beschoner, & Viviani, 2016). Together, it appears
that the dmPFC relates to emotional perceptual and emotional consciousness through its
recruitment during rule-based processing and reappraisal (possibly respectively). Support
converges for the dmPFC serving as a pivotal structure within the type-two emotion regulation
circuit and GNC-2.
Broadly, the vmPFC has largely been implicated in decision making (e.g., Koob, 2013),
fitting well with the necessity of this structure in both perceptual and emotional consciousness
(see LeDoux & Pine, 2016). However, significant evidence has related the vmPFC to various
aspects of emotion and emotion regulation, as activation is associated with behavioral rigidity
(Killcross & Coutureau, 2003). Interestingly, broad mPFC lesions often lead to depressive-like
behaviors, such as learned helplessness (Klein et al., 2010), but inactivation of the vmPFC is
likened to an antidepressant response (Slattery, Neumann, & Cryan, 2011). The primarily
efferent projections from the vmPFC are to the nucleus accumbens shell, but the dmPFC mainly
projects to the nucleus accumbens core (Voorn, Vanderschuren, Groenewegen, Robbins, &
Pennartz, 2004). Notably, experiments have found that the dmPFC- nucleus accumbens core and
vmPFC- nucleus accumbens shell pathways are essential to a) drug-seeking behavior and b)
promotion/inhibition of those behaviors (depending on learning history), respectively (Bossert et
al., 2012; LaLumiere & Kalivas, 2008; McFarland, Lapish, & Kalivas, 2003). By extension, the
vmPFC has efferent projections (Peters, Kalivas, & Quirk, 2008), with evidence that this circuit
is essential for the suppression of inappropriate behavior – possibly promoting or sustaining the
extinction of unreinforced actions. vmPFC promotes actions through its primarily GABAergic
projections to the phasically inhibited neurons of the nucleus accumbens (Riga et al., 2014). Kim
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et al. (2011) provided evidence that fear extinction or acquisition, in large, is mediated by
whether glutamatergic or GABAergic neurons are activated. The release of
glutamatergic/GABAergic is triggered by the lateral nucleus of the amygdala, an area with robust
connections with the nucleus accumbens shell. The vmPFC (limbic and infralimbic subdivisions)
also receives input from the hippocampus and thalamic nuclei, critical in short- and long-term
memory, contextual memory, and spatial navigation (Varela, Kumar, Yang, & Wilson, 2014).
Together with the strong connections between the vmPFC, lateral nucleus of the
amygdala, and nucleus accumbens (Cardinal et al., 2002), it may be hypothesized that the
vmPFC serves as a type-one, unconscious working memory hub, integrating information from
many subcortical and cortical structures, modulating the acquisition, as well as extinction, of
defensive fear behaviors. Ochsner et al. (2012) provide further support, as the vmPFC is
described as integrating affective valuations of specific stimulus (e.g., DFN, ventral striatum).
Specifically receiving input from the MTL, brainstem, and lPFC. Therefore, the vmPFC is
hypothesized to primarily comprise the GNC-1 and be important for type-one emotion
regulation, potentially influencing the particular emotion regulation strategy used. If this
hypothesis is correct, one would suspect that the vmPFC would mediate emotion reappraisal,
such notion has robust support (Motzkin, Phillippi, Wolf, Baskaya, & Koengs, 2015; Gold et al.,
2015; Oschner et al., 2012).

1.7.6. Ventral Lateral and Dorsolateral Prefrontal Cortex (vlPFC; dlPFC)
Broadly, the lPFC has been most consistently associated with conscious awareness (Del
Cul et al., 2009; Pascual-Leone & Walsh, 2001; Vuilleumier et al., 2008). It is unsurprising that
it is likely essential for the GNC in facilitating both perceptual and emotional consciousness.
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Therefore, both of these structures are thought to reflect type-two (and GNC-2) emotion
regulation. The vlPFC has been consistently implicated with the selection/inhibition and
maintenance of goal-relevant information (e.g., reappraisals; Blumfield, Lee, & D’Esposito,
2014; Buhle et al., 2014), verbal retrieval (Wolf, Vasic, & Walter, 2006), verbal fluency
(Hanslmayr, Matuschek, & Fellner, 2014), and various other aspects of semantic retrieval (see
Diamond & Levine, 2017).
Thus, the vlPFC, along with the dlPFC, have strong reciprocal connections with the
hippocampus through the retrospenial and parahippocampus cortices (e.g., Goldman-Rakic et al.,
1984). The vlPFC is consistently found to be activated during type-two emotion regulation,
reappraisal (Wager et al., 2008) Specifically, the vlPFC is critical in top-down modulation of
activity for the retrieval of specific features of information when familiarity and/or stimulusstimulus relations are not sufficient for memory retrieval (Kostopoulos & Petrides, 2016). In
contrast, evidence suggests that the dlPFC has long been implicated in storing, maintaining, and
manipulating working memory representations (e.g., Goldman-Rakic, 1995). This would include
appraisals, suggesting that the dlPFC may be more involved with episodic encoding than the
vlPFC (Buhle et al., 2014; Diamond & Levine, 2017). The results consistently have indicated
that patients with affective disorders tend to over recruit the dlPFC, when compared to controls
(Campbell-Sills et al., 2011; Greening et al., 2013; Johnstone et al., 2007).
Four meta-analyses provide overwhelming evidence for the notion that the lPFC is
critical for perceptual and emotional consciousness, and extendedly, type-two (and GNC-2)
emotion regulation. Of 23 functional imaging studies of healthy participants engaging in
cognitive reappraisal, results indicated that significant (bilateral) dlPFC, vlPFC, dACC, pPL, as
well as the supplementary/premotor area activation (Kohn et al., 2014). Downregulation,
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specifically, was found to correspond to activation in the dlPFC, dACC, and
supplementary/premotor area activation in another meta-analysis of 44 functional imaging
studies (Frank et al., 2014). Buhle et al. (2014) identified the same regions as Kohn et al. (2014),
the dlPFC, vlPFC, dACC, supplementary/premotor area activation, and pPL as important in typetwo emotion regulation. A final meta-analysis, which examined emotion regulation among
clinical populations, consistently found that reduced recruitment of the vlPFC and dlPFC was
related to impaired down-regulation of negative emotion, across clinical populations (Zilverstand
et al., 2017). Not only do the four meta-analyses provide support for the role of the lPFC in typetwo emotion regulation, they also provide substantial converging evidence for the first
overarching hypothesis: regions involved in emotional consciousness are not fundamentally
different than those that facilitate type-one and type-two emotion regulation.
Many researchers have suggested that the lPFC may be better organized along its rostralcaudal axis, where more rostral regions are involved in more complex, abstract, control functions
(Badre & D’Esposito, 2007; Koechlin, Ody, & Kouneiher, 2003; Koechlin & Summerfield,
2007; Nee & Brown, 2012). Extendedly, the mid dlPFC has been associated with imposing
higher-order constraints on more concrete processing in the vlPFC. Other research groups have
suggested that the lPFC is involved in diverse types of cognitive demands, but lacks regional
specificity (e.g., Crittenden & Duncan, 2012). Functionally, the vlPFC seems to be more
generally associated with contextual rules and selection of task-relevant information. In contrast,
the dlPFC seems to be more strongly related to working memory and resolving interference of
task-irrelevant information (Muhl-Karbe et al., 2016). Put differently, the vlPFC may contribute
to cue interpretation and task initiation, but the dlPFC processes task-specific information,
allowing for adjustments in control to be made. Together, the vlPFC may be accurately viewed
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as a central bottleneck between type-one (unconscious, bottom-up) and type-two (conscious, topdown) processing. Moreover, rostral regions of the dlPFC appear to be increasingly important for
type-two, as it aids in the protecting task-goals from interfering stimuli (Muhl-Karbe et al.,
2016). Therefore, it is surmised that the vlPFC and dlPFC appear to be structures central to
GNC-2 and type-two emotion regulation.

1.8. Amygdala Connectivity and Emotion
More evidence of the two-system framework comes from examining the functional
connectivity between lower- (i.e., GNC-1) and higher-order structures (i.e., GNC-2). Clearly, the
amygdala does not operate in isolation, but it appears to serve as a junction within multiple
neural networks (Pessoa, 2008). During resting state fMRI, the amygdala is functionally
correlated with cortical brain regions such as the inferior frontal gyrus and superior frontal gyrus
(Roy, et al. 2009). These results were corroborated by a recent meta-analysis of amygdala
functional connectivity using meta-analytic connectivity modeling (Robinson, Laird, Glahn,
Lovallo, & Fox, 2010).
Overall, amygdala-PFC connectivity has been found to play a critical role in emotion
regulation (Wager et al., 2008), interpretation of emotionally ambiguous facial expressions (Kim,
Somerville, Johnstone, Alexander, & Whalen, 2003), fear conditioning and extinction (LeDoux
2000; Morgan et al., 1993; Quirk, Likhtik, Pelletier, & Paré, 2003; Rosenkranz, Moore, & Grace,
2003), elevated trait anxiety (Kim & Whalen, 2009), and pathological anxiety (Hahn et al.,
2011). Specifically, using resting-state fMRI, Hahn and colleagues (2011) found that individuals
with social anxiety disorder had reduced functional connectivity between the amygdala and the
mOFC. Similar results were found when relating amygdala and mOFC connectivity with anxiety
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in a healthy sample (Kim, Gee, Loucks, Davis, & Whalen, 2010). As well, state anxiety levels in
individuals with social anxiety was inversely correlated with the functional connectivity strength
between the amygdala and the OFC. The latter provides credence for the view that amygdalaPFC circuitry plays a significant role in pathological, as well as trait, anxiety.
Structural connections (i.e., axonal connections) between the amygdala and parts of the
cortex are also associated with emotional processing and anxiety. More recently, anxiety has
been linked to a number of white matter tracts. Specifically, the UF has been found to be
perturbed in individuals with social anxiety disorder, when compared to healthy controls (Phan et
al., 2009). This finding extends to healthy individuals without a history of psychiatric disorders;
where there is a negative correlation between UF volume and trait anxiety (Baur, Hänggi, &
Jäncke, 2012). Moreover, these authors found that the volumes of the left UF and left amygdala
were inversely associated. Overall, the UF has been posited to allow temporal lobe-based
mnemonic associations to alter behavior through interactions with the lOFC, where the lateral
OFC provides information on the valence of a decision (Von Der Heide, Skipper, Klobusicky, &
Olson, 2013). This view suggests that disruption of the UF may cause problems in the use of
memory to guide behavior, as well as in the acquisition of certain types of learning and memory
(e.g., fear learning).
Additionally, there is growing research on the association between the CG white matter
tract and anxiety. The CG tract links within the limbic-cortical networks. The tract begins within
the white matter of the temporal pole, extending to the posterior and superior parietal lobe, down
to the corpus callosum, into the frontal lobe, ending in the anterior and inferior to the genu of the
corpus callosum in the OFC (Schmahmann & Pandya, 2007). Therefore, damage to the CG
bundle is likely to disrupt cognition and emotion regulation, increasing one’s vulnerability for
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the development of mood and anxiety disorders. Diagnostically, deficits in the CG tract have
been linked to panic disorder (Han et al., 2008; Yu et al., 2013), posttraumatic stress disorder
(Abe et al., 2006; Kim et al., 2006), and obsessive-compulsive disorder (Cannistraro et al., 2007;
Chiu et al., 2011). Cognitively, CG integrity is associated with verbal memory (Delano-Wood et
al., 2012), visual memory (Kantarci et al., 2011), executive functioning (e.g., inhibition; MetzlerBaddeley et al., 2012; Schermuly et al., 2010), and impairments that are also found in anxious
samples (Bremner et al., 2004; Gilbertson et al., 2001; Vasterling et al., 1998; Vasterling et al.,
2002; Yehuda et al., 1995). Relatedly, there is some evidence that CG tract integrity is likely to
have a role in the development of anxiety symptoms, possibly via effects on fear-extinction
processes (Fani et al., 2014).

1.9. Empirical Support
1.9.1. Testing the Two-System Framework
Given the two-system framework of emotion regulation, it is unsurprising that the
literature on the relationship between amygdala volume and anxiety has been inconsistent (see
De Bellis et al., 2000; Milham et al., 2005). This is partially attributed to the fact that amygdala
volume is hypothesized to be a proxy for the GNC-1. Without the complementary second system
(i.e., cortical GNC-2), only half a picture is painted. Importantly, amygdala volume during
development has been found to significantly correlate with cortical thickness in the regions that
comprise the GNC (Albaugh et al., 2013).
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1.9.2. Current Study
The current study looks to build on previous literature by determining regions of cortical
thickness that relate to amygdala volume in a sample of typically functioning youth (Albaugh et
al., 2013), with the goal of delineating cortical regions implicated in emotion regulation (i.e.,
GNC-2), demonstrate this relationship is moderated by their structural connectivity, and link
grey-matter thickness (i.e., regions that correlated amygdala volume) and subcortical (i.e.,
amygdala volume) and anxiety symptoms in youth. To this end, utilizing a publicly available
database, the relationship between cortical thickness and right and left amygdala volume was
examined utilizing general linear models. Next, diffusor tensor imaging was used to determine if
white matter structural connectivity moderated the relationship between amygdala volume and
correlated individual cortical thickness. Given the discrepant literature on the relationship
between amygdala volume and anxiety, I suspected that PFC cortical thickness clusters may
control for individual differences in emotion regulation. Therefore, in an exploratory nature, I
then examined whether regions of cortical thickness (determined from the first analyses)
indirectly effect the relationship between youths’ amygdala volume and self-reported anxiety.
Given previous research on the effects of age on the correlation between cortical
thickness and anxiety (Ducharme et al., 2014; Gee et al., 2013; Newman et al., 2016) and the
well-established sex differences in anxiety prevalence (Cartwright-Hatton et al., 2006;
Merikangas et al., 2010), the analyses will be controlled for the effects of age and sex.
Furthermore, youth younger than 10 years of age will be excluded from analyses, given the
literature on the positive to negative shift in connectivity between the amygdala and PFC that
occurs during development (Gee et al., 2013).
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1.10. Hypotheses
Hypothesis 1: amygdala volume in youth will be negatively correlated with regions
involved in the top-down regulation of amygdala activity, such as the lPFC, lOFC, mOFC, aIN,
rACC, and pPL.
Hypothesis 2: volumetric and fractional anisotropy differences in the UF and CG will
moderate the relationship between the amygdala and correlated PFC regions.
Hypothesis 3: gray-matter thickness and amygdala volume will significantly relate to
anxiety symptoms.
Exploratory Hypothesis: the relationship between amygdala volume and anxiety will be
strengthened by the restriction of variance of cortical regions involved in top-down emotion
regulation.
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2. Methods
2.1. Subjects
The present study included a total of 34 typically developing youth (10-17 years; Mage =
13.9, SD = 2.21; 17 females, 17 males; see Table 4.1) from the Nathan Kline Institute Rockland
Sample, which is provided by the Nathan Kline Institute (NY, USA) and publicly available at the
International Neuroimaging Data-sharing Initiative online database. The Nathan Kline Institute
institutional review board approved all procedures for collection and sharing of data. All subjects
were administered the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence, a Full-Scale Intelligence
Quotient over 80 (see Table 4.1). At the time of data acquisition from the Nathan Kline Institute
Rockland Sample database, T1-weighted MRI scans were available for 46 children and
adolescents. Four youth were excluded from the analyses because their MRI scan did not survive
quality control inspection. Seven participants were excluded because of missing data (i.e.,
missing anxiety scores). One participant was excluded because they were younger than 10 yearsold. Written informed consent and child assent was obtained from each participant. Further
details regarding the image acquisition protocol is available on their website
(http://fcon_1000.projects.nitrc.org/indi/pro/nki.html; Nooner et al., 2012).

2.2. Imaging Protocol
The following description of the imaging protocol is taken from Nathan Kline Institute
source (http://fcon_1000.projects.nitrc.org/indi/enhanced/mri_protocol.html): “All subjects were
scanned using a Siemens TrioTM 3.0 T MRI scanner. The 3D T1-weighted images were
acquired using a magnetization-prepared rapid gradient echo sequence (repetition time/echo time
= 2500/3.5 ms, inversion time = 1200 ms, field angle = 8°, field of view = 256 × 256 mm2, voxel
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size = 1.0 ×1.0 × 1.0 mm3, number of slices = 192) and were used for spatial normalization and
group-specific template generation. More details of the MRI protocol are available online
(http://fcon_1000.projects.nitrc.org/indi/enhanced/ mri_protocol.html). Further phenotypic
information may be accessed via the Nathan Kline Institute website (see
http://fcon_1000.projects. nitrc.org/indi/enhanced).” In a subset of Nathan Kline Institute
Rockland Sample, test-retest (< 1 month apart) and longitudinal scans (1.22 ± 0.29 years apart)
demonstrated high reliability for the prediction models obtained and the ability to detect subtle
differences in the longitudinal scan interval among participants (Zhao, Klein, Castellanos, &
Milham, 2019).
Recently developed multiband echo planar Imaging (Moeller et al., 2010) and
multiplexed echo planar imaging (Feinberg et al., 2010) approaches enable the acquisition of
functional MRI and diffusion imaging data with unprecedented sampling rates for full-brain
coverage through the acquisition of multiple slices simultaneously in the same time it takes to
obtain a single slice image using standard echo planar imaging (see Smith et al., 2012) for initial
application of multiband echo planar imaging with recent improvements (Xu et al., 2012). The
Center for Magnetic Resonance Research has provided the Nathan Kline Institute effort with the
latest version of the multiband echo planar imaging sequence (Xu et al., 2012) and associated
image reconstruction algorithms, enabling the acquisition of state-of-the-art imaging datasets for
this large-scale imaging effort. Specific parameter selections were based on initial pilot data to
optimize image quality on the scanner.
The diffusion tensor imaging data were acquired using a 64-direction diffusion tensor
imaging sequence implemented using generalized autocalibrating partial parallel acquisition,
factor=3. A total of 76 diffusion-weighted images were acquired (axial slices = 58; repetition
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time=10ms, echo time=91ms; field of view=256 mm; b-value=1000 s/mm2; in-plane resolution =
2x2 mm2; slice thickness=2 mm; no inter-slice gap). The acquisition time for this protocol was
13.5 minutes.

2.3. Cortical Reconstruction and Calculation of Thickness
Cortical thickness was estimated from the structural magnetic resonance images using
FreeSurfer software (http://surfer. nmr.mgh.harvard.edu, Dale et al. 1999), a set of automated
tools for the reconstruction of brain cortical surface (Fischl & Dale 2000). First, I used the T1weighted images to segment cerebral white matter and to estimate the grey-white matter
interface. Then topographical defects in the grey-white estimate were fixed. This grey-white
matter estimate was used as the starting point of a deformable surface algorithm searching for the
pial surface. The whole cortex of each individual subject was visually inspected for inaccuracies
in segmentation and manually corrected if necessary. Local cortical thickness was measured
based on the difference between the position of equivalent vertices in the pial and grey-white
matter surfaces. The surface of the grey-white matter border was inflated and differences
between subjects in the depth of gyri and sulci were normalized. Each subject’s reconstructed
brain was morphed and registered to an average spherical surface. In order to obtain cortical
thickness difference maps the data were smoothed on the surface using a Gaussian smoothing
kernel with a full-width half maximum of 10 mm. Statistical thickness difference maps were
constructed using t-statistics. I used a regression approach to focus on the relationship between
amygdala volume and cortical thickness, controlling for age and sex, using general linear
modeling (www.surfer.nmr.mgh.harvard.edu). Only regions that survived a Monte Carlo
correction (p < 0.05) are shown.
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2.4. Tract-of-Interest Analyses
Diffusion-weighted data were processed for each participant using FreeSurfer’s
TRACULA (Yendiki 2011), which makes use of FSL’s FMRIB's Diffusion Toolbox software for
some of the preprocessing of the diffusion-weighted image. TRACULA is an automated method
for reconstructing probabilistic distributions of major white-matter tracts for individual diffusionweighted image data based on anatomical priors. It relies on an atlas of manually labeled major
white matter tracts and anatomical segmentations from an independent sample of participants’
data. TRACULA is able to construct 18 different major fiber tracts by using these anatomical
priors in a probabilistic framework to perform tractography in novel individuals. I selected two a
priori tracts-of-interest: The UF and CG.
TRACULA performs three processing steps. First, data is preprocessed with ball-andstick model fitting to the diffusion-weighted image data, and tract reconstruction (Behrens et al.,
2007). Preprocessing of the diffusion-weighted images included eddy current and motion
correction using FMRIB's Diffusion Toolbox, intra-subject registration of diffusion-weighted
images to T1 using FreeSurfer’s bbregister, inter-subject registration of individual T1 images to
the MNI template, the generation of white-matter and cortex masks from the FreeSurfer outputs
and whole-brain masks from the diffusion-weighted and T1 images, tensor fitting using FMRIB's
Diffusion Toolbox’s DTIFIT, and the generation of anatomical priors for the white-matter tracts
from the training data and the individual subject data. After preprocessing ball-and-stick model
fitting was performed using FMRIB's Diffusion Toolbox’s BEDPOSTX, which establishes a
distribution of diffusion parameters at each voxel to allow for probabilistic tractography. Finally,
tract reconstruction is performed by combining the anatomical priors with individual diffusion
orientations and anatomical segmentations in each participant’s native diffusion-weighted image
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space. After reconstruction, mean functional anisotropy (i.e., a measure of white-matter integrity
derived from the ration of radial and axial diffusivity) was extracted from each tract. All
participants demonstrated successful tracking of both tracts-of-interest.
The UF and CG were selected a priori as they connect the limbic system to various
aspects of the PFC cortex. Both regions also have an established relationship with anxious
symptoms. I sought to determine if their functional anisotropy (i.e., a measure sensitive to
several tissue characteristics such as myelination, axon diameter, fiber density, fiber
organization) and/or their volume moderates the relationship between the amygdala volume and
cortical thickness, which I would predict if the any grey-matter relationship between amygdala
and frontoparietal regions were due to connectivity. Only ipsilateral analyses were examined
(i.e., right amygdala to right cortical thickness; left amygdala to left cortical thickness), using the
right UF/CG FA/volume and left UF/CG FA/volume, respectively.

2.5. Measures
The MASC (March, 1998) is a 45-item self-report questionnaire for symptoms of anxiety in
youth. Total scores range from 0 to 120, with high scores indicating greater childhood anxiety.
The four empirically derived factor index scores are Social Anxiety, Separation Anxiety, Harm
Avoidance, and Physical Symptoms. The MASC has shown good internal consistency ratings
from .70 to .83 and Cronbach’s alpha ranging from .74 to .85 (March, 1998). Further, the MASC
has demonstrated good convergent validity (Baldwin & Dadds, 2007), good concurrent validity
(Rynn et al., 2006), adequate divergent validity, and good test-retest reliability (March, Parker,
Sullivan, Stallings, & Conners, 1997). The total t-score of the MASC was used, which
demonstrated high internal consistency (α = .87).
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3. Analytic Plan
3.1. Statistical Analyses
My first hypothesis was tested vertex wise across the brain surface by fitting GLMs of the effect
of amygdala volume (corrected for total intracranial volume) on thickness in every vertex across
the surface. Thus, I performed separate analyses for right and left amygdala to determine their
independent relationships with cortical thickness across youth. Multiple linear regressions
included the main effects and interactions between individual mean tract volume/tract functional
anisotropy (respectively) and amygdala volume in an effort to predict cortical thickness clusters.
Finally, Pearson’s correlations were used to determine if cortical and subcortical grey-matter
volumes would significantly correlate with self-reported anxiety.
As previously mentioned, because age is negatively associated with cortical thickness
(Gee et al., 2013; Fjell et al., 2009; Salat et al., 2004; Westlye et al., 2009) and girls tend to have
elevated levels of anxiety compared to boys (Kessler et al., 2012), I included age and sex as
covariates in all statistical models. To reduce the probability of Type I errors, all cortical
thickness analyses were corrected for multiple comparisons using cluster size inference by means
of Z MCS as implemented in FreeSurfer (Hayasaka & Nichols, 2003; Hagler et al., 2006). All
clusters were tested against an empirical null distribution of maximum cluster size built using
synthesized Z-distributed data across 10,000 permutations. These analyses yielded clusters fully
corrected for multiple comparisons across the surface. The initial cluster-forming threshold
employed will be p < 0.05. Surface-based t-statistics for each corrected cluster, representing raw
effect-sizes across the brain, will also be presented (p < 0.05). I also present surface-based tstatistics for each corrected cluster, representing raw effect-sizes across the brain.
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In sum, I first determined the independent associations between right/left amygdala
volume (corrected for total intracranial volume) and cortical thickness in youth (respectively).
Following, I completed an interaction analysis to determine whether white matter structural
connectivity moderates the relationship between the amygdala volume and correlated cortical
regions. Next, the relationship between cortical/subcortical grey matter and anxiety symptoms
was explored. Finally, I explored whether PFC cortical thickness clusters have an indirect effect
on the relationship between youths’ amygdala volume and youth’s self-reported anxiety.
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4. Results
4.1. Demographics
Youths’ demographic, psychometric, and neurocognitive data are reported in Table 4.1. All
subjects had a Full-Scale Intelligence Quotient over 80 (see mean and minimum/maximum
values in Table 4.1 using the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence, second edition). At the
time of data acquisition from the Nathan Kline Institute Rockland Sample database, T1-weighted
MRI scans were available for 46 children and adolescents. Four youth were excluded from the
analysis because their MRI scan did not survive quality control inspection. Seven participants
were excluded because of missing MASC scores. One participant was excluded because they
were younger than 10 years-old. Thus, the final sample, on which the analyses were performed,
included 34 youth.

Table 4.1. Demographics and psychometric scales.
Demographics (n = 34)
Males
Age (years)
Right Handedness
Race
White
Black
Asian
Ethnicity-Non-Hispanic/Spanish
Psychometric Scales (n = 34)
MASC-Total T-Score
WASI-FSIQ

N (%) or mean ±SD (range)
17 (50.0%)
13.91±2.21 (10-17)
30 (88.2%)
24 (70.6%)
6 (17.6%)
4 (11.8%)
24 (70.6%)
46.19±9.15 (26-68)
108.82±12.05 (83-129)
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4.2. Amygdala Volume and Cortical Thickness: Ipsilateral Analyses
Figure 4.1 shows MCS corrected maps from a GLM testing the relationship between amygdala
volume and ipsilateral cortical thickness in a cluster-wise manner, corrected to p < .05. Full
results can be found in Table 4.2, which shows significant zMCS corrected clusters resulting
from a significant relationship between amygdala volume and ipsilateral cortical thickness with
age and sex as covariates. All clusters showed a negative effect, consistent with previous
literature (e.g., Ducharme et al., 2014).

Table 4.2. Ipsilateral relationships between cortical thickness and right/left amygdala. Note. Zvalue based on voxel of peak effect size; p-value calculated from the Z-value; Cluster size is
mm2.

Variable/Location
Right Amygdala
Negative Effects
RMF; vlPFC
SPL
SFG; dPFC
Cuneus
Left Amygdala
Negative Effects
lOFC; vlPFC; rACC

L/R

X

Y

Z

Cluster Size

Z-value

p

R
R
R
R

27.6
10.3
21.5
19.4

56.1
-49.5
6.2
-66.2

-11.0
69.4
57.5
13.8

4896.21
2119.75
1315.67
3733.19

-4.725
-4.501
-3.093
-2.658

<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
<.01

L

-12.2

53.8

-17.5

4409.42

-6.475

<.0001

4.2.1. Right Amygdala Volume and Right Hemisphere Cortical Thickness
Most notably, in the right hemisphere, significant clusters were observed in the RMF extending
down to the vlPFC and parts of the lOFC (p < .0001). In addition, a significant cluster was
observed in the SFG and dPFC (p < .0001) and in the SPL (p < 0001).
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SF (dPFC)
RMF

SPL
RH
4.00

vlPFC

3.00
2.00

rACC

1.30

LH
vlPFC

OFC

vlPFC

Figure 4.1. Ipsilateral relationships between cortical thickness and right/left amygdala. The light
blue-dark blue scale represents the effect-size in Freesurfer’s -log10(p) format.
4.2.2. Left Amygdala Volume and Left Hemisphere Cortical Thickness
The relationship between left amygdala volume and cortical thickness in the left hemisphere
indicated one larger, robust cluster in the LOFC extending into the vlPFC and back into the
rACC (z = 6.475; p < .00001).

4.3. Amygdala Volume and Cortical Thickness: Contralateral Analyses
Figure 4.2 shows MCS corrected maps from a GLM testing the relationship between amygdala
volume and contralateral cortical thickness in a cluster-wise manner, correct to p < .05. Full
results can be found in Table 4.3.
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Table 4.3. Contralateral relationships between cortical thickness and right/left amygdala. Note.
Z-value based on voxel of peak effect size; p-value calculated from the Z-value; Cluster size is
mm2

Variable/Location
Right Amygdala
Negative Effects
RMF; vlPFC; dlPFC
PCL
FG
SFG; dmPFC
PCS /Post-CG
Pre-CG
MTG
Left Amygdala
Negative Effects
RMF; vlPFC
SPL 1
SPL 2

L/R

X

Y

Z

Cluster Size Z-value

p

L
L
L
L
L
L
L

-36.9
-15.6
-28.9
-7.0
-20.3
-57.1
-62.1

28.7 32.7
-42.3 65.1
-46.6 -18.6
26.2 45.9
-70.9 19.2
-3.6 15.2
-41.8 -6.2

8121.95
2865.01
4014.20
1890.96
3479.10
1307.37
1181.93

-4.062
-3.969
-3.934
-3.259
-2.977
-2.265
-2.245

<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
<.001
<.01
<.01
<.01

R
R
R

28.5
11.0
18.0

54.9 -10.9
-51.5 67.5
-86.1 22.2

4027.26
1624.84
1277.79

-4.795
-3.427
-2.277

<.0001
<.001
<.01

4.3.1. Right Amygdala Volume and Left Hemisphere Cortical Thickness
There were seven significant clusters observed. Most notably, there was a large cluster detected
in the RMF extending down to the vlPFC, parts of the lOFC, and over to the superior and MTG
(p < .0001). Additionally, a significant cluster was observed in the SFG and dmPFC (p < .0001)
and in the SPL (p < .0001).
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Figure 4.2. Contralateral relationships between cortical thickness and right/left amygdala. The
light blue-dark blue scale represents the effect-size in Freesurfer’s -log10(p) format.
4.3.2. Left Amygdala Volume and Right Hemisphere Cortical Thickness
The relationship between left amygdala volume and cortical thickness in the right hemisphere
had three significant clusters. The largest and most robust cluster was located in the RMF
extending down to the vlPFC and over into the vmPFC (p < .0001). An additional two clusters
were observed in the SPL (p < .01).

4.4. Interaction Between Amygdala and Functional Connectivity
Multiple regressions were used to test the hypotheses that the ipsilateral relationships between
amygdala volume and cortical thickness were moderated by UF and/or CG volume and fractional
anisotropy with age and sex as covariates. Figure 4.3 demonstrate the significant interaction
effect, all of which were found utilizing tract volume.
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4.4.1. Right Amygdala Volume by Right UF Volume Predicting Ipsilateral Cortical
Thickness
Results indicated that the volume of the right UF tract significantly moderated the relationship
between right amygdala volume and cortical thickness in the right SPL. In the model with right
amygdala volume and right UF volume as predictors of right SPL cortical thickness, only right
amygdala volume (β = -.630, t(31) = -4.493, p > .001) significantly predicted right SPL cortical
thickness, F(3, 29) = 9.228, p < .001; Adjusted R2 = .488. The addition of the interaction of right
amygdala volume and right UF volume was statistically significant (β = -.303, t(31) = -1.987, p =
.05).
Right UF volume significantly moderated the relationship between right amygdala
volume and cortical thickness in the right cuneus. In the model with right amygdala volume and
right UF volume as predictors of right cuneus thickness, right amygdala volume (β = -.498, t(31)
= -3.66, p = .001) and right UF volume (β = -.371, t(31) = -2.481, p < .05) significantly predicted
cuneus thickness, F(3, 29) = 10.463, p < .00001; Adjusted R2 = .469. The addition of the
interaction of right amygdala volume and right UF volume was also statistically significant (β = .542, t(31) = -3.662, p = .001).
The relationship between right amygdala volume and cortical thickness in the right
RMF/vlPFC was only trending towards significance (β = -.266, t(31) = -1.743, p = .092), with
only right amygdala volume (β = -.676, t(31) = -4.669, p < .001) and right UF volume (β = -.314,
t(31) = -2.013, p = .05) significantly predicting right RMF/vlPFC cortical thickness, F(3, 29) =
9.239, p < .001; Adjusted R2 = .436.
In the model with right amygdala volume and right UF volume predicting right
SFG/dPFC cortical thickness, only right amygdala volume was significant (β = -.531, t(31) = 3256, p < .01).
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4.4.2. Right Amygdala Volume by Right CG Volume Predicting Ipsilateral Cortical
Thickness
The volume of the right CG significantly moderated the relationship between right amygdala
volume and right RMF/vlPFC cortical thickness. In the model with right amygdala volume and
right CG volume as predictors of right RMF/vlPFC thickness, right amygdala volume (β = -.807,
t(31) = -6.752, p < .00001) and right CG volume (β = -.463, t(31) = -3.829, p < .001)
significantly predicted right RMF/vlPFC thickness, F(3, 29) = 16.895, p < .00001; Adjusted R2 =
.598. The addition of the interaction of right amygdala volume and right CG volume was
statistically significant (β = -.322, t(31) = -2.798, p < .01).
The remaining models testing the hypotheses that the relationship between right
amygdala volume and the remaining three right hemisphere cortical thickness clusters (i.e., SPL,
SFG/dPFC, and cuneus) would be moderated by CG volume were not significant.

4.4.3. Left Amygdala Volume by Left UF Volume Predicting Ipsilateral Cortical Thickness
The left UF volume significantly moderates the relationship between left amygdala volume and
left lOFC/vlPFC cortical thickness. In the model with left amygdala volume and left UF volume
as predictors of left lOFC/vlPFC cortical thickness, only left amygdala volume (β = -.692, t(31)
= -5.344, p < .0001) significantly predicted left lOFC/vlPFC thickness, F(3, 29) = 11.361, p <
.00001; Adjusted R2 = .493. The addition of the interaction of left amygdala volume and left UF
volume was statistically significant (β = -.343, t(31) = -2.444, p < .05).

4.4.4. Left Amygdala Volume by Left CG Volume Predicting Ipsilateral Cortical Thickness
The volume of the left CG tract significantly moderated the relationship between left amygdala
volume and left lOFC/vlPFC cortical thickness. In the model with left amygdala volume and left

57

CG volume as predictors of left lOFC/vlPFC cortical thickness, only left amygdala volume (β = .739, t(31) = -5.564, p < .0001) significantly predicted left lOFC/vlPFC thickness, F(3, 29) =
10.856, p < .00001; Adjusted R2 = .480. The addition of the interaction of left amygdala volume
and left CG volume was statistically significant (β = -.299, t(31) = -2.256, p < .05).
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Figure 4.3. (A) Volume of the left uncinate fasciculus moderates the relationship between left
amygdala volume and left OFC/rACC cortical thickness. (B) Volume of the left CG moderates
the relationship between left amygdala volume and left lOFC/vlPFC/rACC) cortical thickness.
(C) Volume of the right CG moderates the relationship between right amygdala volume and right
RMF/vlPFC cortical thickness.
4.5. Correlations Among Amygdala, Cortical Thickness, and Anxiety Symptoms
Full results of the correlations among brain volume (i.e., right/left amygdala volume), significant
ipsilateral cortical thickness clusters (i.e., right RMF/vlPFC, right SPL, right SFG/dPFC, right
cuneus, and left lOFC/vlPFC), anxiety symptoms (i.e., MASC total T-Score) are located in Table
4.4.
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Right and left amygdala volume did not significantly correlate with self-reported anxiety.
As shown in Figure 4.4, cortical thickness in the right SPL (r = .344, p < .05). Similarly, right
RMF/vlPFC cortical thickness significantly correlated with youth’s anxiety symptoms (r = .489,
p < .01), as did cortical thickness in the left lOFC/vlPFC (r = .494, p < .01). Cortical thickness in
the right SFG/dPFC (r = .314, p < .10) and right cuneus (r = .30, p < .10) trended towards
significance.

A)A.

B)B.

D)

E)

C)C.

F)

Figure 4.4. (A) The relationship between right SPL cortical thickness and anxiety symptoms (B)
The relationship between right RMF/vlPFC cortical thickness and anxiety symptoms. (C) The
relationship between left lOFC/vlPFC/rACC cortical thickness and anxiety symptoms.
4.6. Correlations Among UF Volume, CG Volume, and Anxiety Symptoms
Table 4.4 shows the full results of the correlations among UF volume, CG volume, and anxiety
symptoms (i.e., MASC total T-Score). CG volume significantly correlated with anxiety
symptoms (r = -.41, p < .05). In addition, UF volume demonstrated a trend toward significance (r
= -.29, p < .10). All other correlations were either not significant.

59

Table 4.4. Pearson’s correlations among right/left amygdala, ipsilateral cortical thickness, and
anxiety symptoms (top); Pearson’s correlations among right/left UF, right/left CG, and anxiety
symptoms (bottom). Note: * = p < .05; † = p < .10.
Subcortical and Cortical Volumes
Right Amygdala
Left Amygdala
OFC / vlPFC / rACC
RMF / vlPFC
SPL
SF / dPFC
Cuneus
Tracts-of-Interest
Right Hemisphere
UF Volume
UF Functional Anisotropy
CG Volume
CG Functional Anisotropy
Left Hemisphere
UF Functional Anisotropy
UF Volume
CG Volume
CG Functional Anisotropy

Anxiety symptoms
-.23
-.14
.49*
.44*
.34*
.31†
.30†
-.09
-.27
-.41*
-.22
-.29†
-.29†
-.19
-.28

4.7. Tests of Indirect Effects: Two-System Framework of Emotion Regulation
Despite finding no relationship between amygdala volume and anxiety symptoms, given
previous literature, I conducted a test of indirect effects given the finding that clusters in the PFC
associated with amygdala volume have a robust relationship with anxiety symptoms.
Specifically, a suppression effect was suspected during the post-hoc examination of the
Pearson’s correlations between right/left amygdala volume and anxious symptomatology (r = 14, p > .05; r = -23, p > .05), as well as the strong positive relationship between the right
RMF/vlPFC and left OFC/vlPFC/rACC and anxious symptomatology (respectively) (r = 49, p <
.05; r = 44, p < .05; See Table 4.4).
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As noted in the introduction, the literature is equivocal on the association between
amygdala volume and anxious symptomatology (e.g., De Bellis et al., 2000; Milham et al.,
2005), with more recent research on cortical regions involved while youth regulate their
emotional responses (Wager, Davidson, Hughes, & Lindquist, 2008; Buhle et al. 2014; Silvers et
al., 2015; Silvers et al., 2016). Therefore, it was hypothesized that the relationship between right
amygdala volume and self-reported anxiety would be indirectly affected by right RMF/vlPFC,
whereas the OFC/vlPFC/rACC will have an indirect effect on the relationship between left
amygdala volume and self-reported anxiety.
Put differently, I first explored whether the relationship between right/left amygdala
volume and self-reported anxiety would strengthen once the restricted variance of associated
cortical thickness regions is considered. First, right amygdala volume’s relationship with anxiety
symptoms was examined controlling for individual variance in the right RMF/vlPFC. In the left
hemisphere, the left OFC/vlPFC/rACC was examined as potentially restricting the variance of
the model, allowing for a more robust relationship between left amygdala volume and selfreported anxiety to emerge.
The test of indirect effects was run using the Preacher and Hayes model (2004). These
clusters, which were previously identified via GLM analyses, (see Figure 4.1), were evaluated
for total effect of amygdala volume on anxiety symptoms, which was divided into direct and
indirect effects that vary as a function of the explanation of variance provided by the presence of
the respective cortical thickness PFC clusters. A bootstrapping method with 10,000 iterations
was used to test the 95% confidence intervals of the indirect effect (Palaniyappan, Simmonite,
White, Liddle, & Liddle, 2013). All analyses included age and sex as covariates. Variables used
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include right amygdala volume controlled for intracranial volume, MASC total T-Score, and
mean PFC cluster thickness generated from the previously ran GLMs.

4.7.1. The Indirect Effect of Cortical Thickness in the Right Hemisphere
Results of this analysis indicated a reduction in gray matter volume in the vlPFC indirectly
affected the relationship between right amygdala volume and differences in anxiety symptoms.
The test of indirect effect model for vlPFC cortical thickness (R2 = 0.53; F[4, 29] = 11.39, p <
.00001; total effect coefficient = 0.0262) had significant fit. However, right amygdala volume
had a non-significant direct effect on anxiety symptoms (t(33) = .85 p > .05) and a nonsignificant
indirect effect (t(33) = -1.31, p = .19). However, mean gray matter volume in the vlPFC had a
significant direct effect on anxiety symptoms (t(33) = 2.95, p < .01), 95% confidence limits from
bootstrap test (11.62 – 64.19) and a significant indirect effect (completely standardized
coefficient (SD) = -.42 (.14), p < .05), 95% confidence limits from bootstrap test (-.74 – -.17).

4.7.2. The Indirect Effect of Cortical Thickness in the Left Hemisphere
Results of this analysis indicated that left amygdala related differences in anxiety symptoms was
indirectly affected by reduced gray matter thickness in the vlPFC. The test of indirect effect
model for vlPFC cortical thickness (R2 = 0.56; F[4, 29] = 12.60, p < . 00001; total effect
coefficient = 0.027) had significant fit. Left amygdala volume had a significant direct effect on
anxiety symptoms (t(33) = 2.33, p < .05) and a non-significant indirect effect (t(33) = -.82, p >
.05). Mean gray matter thickness in the vlPFC had a significant direct effect on anxiety
symptoms (t(33) = 4.39, p < .01), 95% confidence limits from bootstrap testing (26.80 – 73.56)
and a significant indirect effect, completely standardized coefficient (SD) = -.61 (.17), p < .05,

62

95% confidence limits from bootstrap test (-.95 – -.30). There was a large effect, where the
partial correlations between left amygdala volume and anxiety symptoms (with age and sex as
covariates) increased (r = -.08, p > .05) when the left vlPFC grey matter volume was added as a
covariate (r = .50, p < .01). See Figure 4.5.
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Figure 4.5. (A)Left vlPFC cortical thickness has an indirect effect on the relationship between
left amygdala volume (controlled for intracranial volume) and anxiety symptoms; * = p < .01, **
= p < .0001; standardized betas (standard error); anxiety symptoms as measured by the MASC
T-score; covariates included sex and age. (B) Scatterplot illustrating no relationship between left
amygdala volume and anxiety symptoms with only sex as a covariate (left; p > .05); Scatter plot
of the partial correlation between left amygdala volume and anxiety symptoms with left vlPFC
cortical thickness, sex, and age as covariates (p < .0001). All measures were centered prior to
analysis (hence negative values).
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4.8. Follow-up Analyses: Right/Left Amygdala Volume by Right/Left vlPFC Thickness as
Respective Predictors of Self-Reported Anxiety
Follow-up analyses were conducted on the variables included in the two tests of indirect effect
analyses in an effort to provide further support for the independence of these two systems. To
this end, I utilized two linear multiple regressions to examine whether right/left amygdala
volume is moderated by gray matter volume in the right/left vlPFC. Results are congruent with
the above findings of the independence of these neural systems.
The main effects of right amygdala volume and right vlPFC, along with their interaction,
were examined as predictors of self-reported anxiety. The overall model, F(5, 26) = 1.58, p >
.05; R2 = .233, was not significant. Examining the test of higher order unconditional interactions
was also not a significant predictor of youths’ self-reported anxiety, F(1, 26) = 1.67, p > .05; ΔR2
= .049, p > .05.
The main effects of left amygdala volume and left vlPFC, along with their interaction,
were examined as predictors of self-reported anxiety. The overall model, F(5, 26) = 2.28, , p >
.05; R2 = .305, was not significant. Examining the test of higher order unconditional interactions
was also not a significant predictor of youths’ self-reported anxiety, F(1, 26) = 2.26, p > .05; ΔR2
= .060, p > .05.
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5. Discussion
The purpose of this study was three-fold. First, I aimed to 1) determine regions of cortical
thickness that relate to amygdala volume in a sample of typically functioning youth, with the
goal of identifying cortical regions implicated in emotion regulation, 2) I looked to establish if
this relationship was moderated by their structural connectivity, and 3) then link grey-matter
thickness (i.e., regions that correlated amygdala volume) and subcortical volume (i.e.,
amygdala), and anxiety symptoms.
I hypothesized that amygdala volume in older youth (i.e., >10 years old) would be
negatively correlated with regions involved in the top-down regulation of amygdala activity (i.e.,
ventral and dorsal PFC, lOFC, and mOFC, and the parietal lobe; See Gee et al., 2013; Silvers et
al., 2016). Additionally, I posited that the volumetric and functional anisotropy differences in the
UF and CG tracts would moderate the relationship between the amygdala and predicted graymatter thickness (i.e., regions that correlated amygdala volume). Next, I hypothesized that
cortical and subcortical grey-matter volume would significantly correlate with anxiety symptoms
in youth. Finally, in an exploratory nature, I examined whether the relationship between
amygdala volume and anxiety symptoms would strengthen once the restrictive variance of
associated cortical regions is considered.

5.1. General Linear Model: Amygdala Volume and Cortical Thickness
I found support for my first hypothesis that older youths’ amygdala volume would be
negatively correlated with regions involved in the top-down regulation of amygdala activity; the
ventral and dorsal PFC, lOFC, mOFC, and pPL were correlated with youths’ amygdala volume
(while controlling for intracranial volume) and survived the MCS to reduce the likelihood of
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type-one errors. The negative relationship between amygdala volume and PFC thickness is
congruent with the functional cross-sectional research done on amygdala-PFC connectivity
throughout development (e.g., Ducharme et al., 2014; Gee et al., 2013).
The findings are also in line with structural studies examining the relationship between
reported anxiety and cortical thickness. Specifically, Ducharme and colleagues (2014)
demonstrated that cortical thickness in portions of the vmPFC/mOFC are positively correlated
with anxiety in childhood (i.e., < 9 years), but negatively correlated in adolescents and young
adults. Similarly, Newman and colleagues (2015) found that anxiety was negatively correlated
with vmPFC cortical thickness, but the relationship diminished with age. Furthermore, this
positive-negative connectivity switch has also been found functionally by Gee et al. (2013) as
well. Specifically, there is evidence that there is a developmental reversal of function in
amygdala-PFC connectivity where positive amygdala-PFC connectivity, found in early
childhood, becomes negative during the transition to adolescence. Although I did not have a
sample of young children large enough to demonstrate positive relationships earlier in
development (cross-sectionally), the negative relationships among the amygdala and regions
involved in the top-down regulation in older youth is congruent with past literature (e.g.,
Ducharme et al., 2014; Newman et al., 2015).
The PFC clusters found to be associated with amygdala volume overlap with the
functional literature on emotion regulation as well. For instance, functional literature has
consistently found that activity in the PFC, along with the pPL, are associated with emotion
regulation (e.g., Ochsner & Gross, 2005). More specifically, the vmPFC, vlPFC, dlPFC, and
dmPFC cortices have been found to be associated with cognitive control of negative emotion
(Wager, et al., 2008; Buhle et al. 2014; Silvers et al., 2015; 2016). It has been suggested that the
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emotion regulation network includes the ventral PFC, dorsal PFC, lOFC, and mOFC, as well as
the pPL (Buhle et al. 2014; Ducharme, 2014; Gee et al., 2013; Newman et al., 2015; Silvers et
al., 2015; 2016; Wager et al. 2008). The structural PFC cortical thickness clusters I found had
significant overlap with the aforementioned functional emotion regulation network. To my
knowledge, this is the first study to demonstrate that correlating subcortical grey matter structural
volume (e.g., amygdala) with cortical thickness may be a parsimonious and useful method for
exploring potential cortical regions related to emotion regulation.
The contralateral analyses were more robust which was unexpected. These results were
difficult to interpret given the dearth of literature examining the relationship between
contralateral cortical areas that are associated with the amygdala and, presumably, related to
emotion regulation. Despite these analyses being exploratory, the results were largely congruent
with the ipsilateral analyses, as well as the larger emotion regulation literature. While this may
be partially explained by the large correlation between an individual’s right/left amygdala
volumes; however, if multicollinearity solely explained the contralateral effects it would be
surprising for the results of the contralateral analyses to be more robust (i.e., larger effect size
and more cortical regions identified). More research is needed on ipsilateral and contralateral
cortical areas and their structural/functional connectivity with the amygdala as it relates to an
individual being able to appropriately regulate his or her emotions.
Consistent with some of the previous literature in pediatric samples examining the
relationship between amygdala volume and self-reported anxiety (De Bellis et al., 2000), neither
the right nor left amygdala were correlated with anxiety. When examining the correlation
between mean cortical thickness in clusters found to be related to amygdala volume in the
GLMs, the lOFC/vlPFC/rACC, right RMF/vlPFC, and right SPL (in the ipsilateral analyses)
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were significantly related to self-reported anxiety symptoms in youth. These findings provide
support for the clusters related to amygdala volume as being important in emotion regulation. To
my knowledge, this is the first study to demonstrate evidence that subcortical grey-matter
volume correlates with regions of the cortex that are associated with emotion regulation.

5.2. Interaction Analyses: Amygdala Volume and White Matter
The current study attempted to provide further support for the notion that the amygdala and
associated cortical structures were related to due to their connectivity, and therefore, important
for the regulation of emotion. To this end, I provided partial support for my hypothesis that the
relationship between amygdala volume and correlated individual cortical thickness clusters
would be moderated by their structural connectivity. I decided a priori the UF and CG would
serve as the tracts-of-interest, as they have been found to be perturbed in anxious samples (Abe
et al., 2006; Bremner et al., 2004; Cannistraro et al., 2007; Chiu et al., 2011; Gilbertson et al.,
2001; Phan et a., 2009; Vasterling et al., 1998; Vasterling et al., 2002; Yehuda et al., 1995; Han
et al., 2008; Yu et al., 2013) and play a role in fear extinction processes (Fani et al., 2014). My
hypothesis that reduced volume and/or poor CG tract integrity may disrupt cognition and
emotion regulation was only partially supported.
In the right hemisphere, the volume of the UF significantly moderated the relationship
between amygdala volume and cortical thickness of the SFG, SPL, and cuneus. CG volume was
only found to moderate the relationship between amygdala volume and cortical thickness in the
RMF/vlPFC. Interestingly, the most robust moderations were those with regions that are most
consistently linked with emotion regulation in youth (Silvers et al., 2015, 2016). For instance, the
moderation analyses predicting lOFC/vlPFC/rACC cortical thickness and right RMF/vlPFC
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cortical thickness were found to demonstrate the most robust moderating effects, consistent with
a wealth of functional literature on regions important for emotion regulation (Buhle et al. 2014;
Ducharme, 2014; Gee et al., 2013; Newman et al., 2015; Silvers et al., 2015; 2016; Wager et al.
2008). The CG volume was the only tract variable that was significantly (negatively) related to
anxiety symptoms. Counter to my hypothesis, neither UF volume nor the functional anisotropy
were correlated with anxiety symptoms.
In the left hemisphere, ipsilateral analyses indicated that both the CG and UF volumes
significantly moderated the relationship between amygdala volume and the OFC/vlPFC cortical
thickness cluster, providing further support that the ipsilateral GLM analyses reflected that the
amygdala volume (controlled for intracranial volume) was predicting cortical thickness clusters
potentially due to their structural connectivity.
The findings also indicate that tract volume, but not FA, may have a stronger effect on
the relationship between amygdala volume and the PFC, as well as self-reported anxiety in
youth. Models including tract volume, but not FA, were the only significant models.
Additionally, only the mean volume of the CG was significantly (negatively) related to anxiety
symptoms. However, these findings should be interpreted with caution as it may reflect that both
variables of the interaction term are structural volumes (i.e., tract and amygdala volumes). Future
research should continue to explore both the functional anisotropy and volume of the UF and CG
tracts as my findings indicate that their volumes have a differential effect on the relationship
between amygdala volume and PFC cortical thickness clusters.
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5.3. Test of Indirect Effects
A combination of previous inconsistent past literature, and the post-hoc suppression effect
observed, I conducted an exploratory test of indirect effects. As noted in the introduction, the
literature is equivocal on the association between amygdala volume and anxious
symptomatology (De Bellis et al., 2000; Milham et al., 2005), with more recent research on
cortical regions involved while youth regulate their emotional responses (Wager, Davidson,
Hughes, & Lindquist, 2008; Buhle et al. 2014; Silvers et al., 2015; Silvers et al., 2016).
Therefore, it was hypothesized that the relationship between right amygdala volume and selfreported anxiety would be indirectly affected by right RMF/vlPFC, whereas the OFC/vlPFC/
rACC will have an indirect effect on the relationship between left amygdala volume and selfreported anxiety.
The exploratory analyses were conducted based on past research not taking into
consideration the role of individual differences in top-down regulation may have one the
relationship between amygdala volume and anxiety (De Bellis et al., 2000; Milham et al., 2005).
I conducted these analyses because it was suspected that the relationship between amygdala
volume and anxiety would strengthen due to the restricted variance of associated cortical
thickness regions. I found partial support for this hypothesis: the left amygdala was indirectly
related to self-reported anxiety through the mean thickness of the left lOFC/vlPFC. Specifically,
the indirect effect of cortical thickness in the vlPFC significantly strengthened the correlation
between left amygdala volume self-reported anxiety; while there was not a direct effect of
amygdala volume and anxiety, as would be expected from the Pearson correlations (r = -.08), the
inclusion of mean cortical thickness in the vlPFC led to a robust relationship between left
amygdala volume and anxiety (r = .50).
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Neurologically, the amygdala is a collection of nuclei, which is all captured by the single
volume variable used to quantify the amygdala (Kim et al., 2011). It is well known that different
nuclei of the amygdala serve various functions (e.g., sensory input and memory input), and it is
not a unitary structure. Since the current study used the entire amygdala volume, capturing all
nuclei, this may explain a portion of the results extending to many areas related, functionally,
with emotion regulation. Studies parsing the neural correlates of certain aspects of the amygdala
(i.e., lateral nucleus) would be particularly interesting.
These results have important implications for future research. From a practical
standpoint, conducting an MRI is much easier (especially with youth) and cheaper than
functional imagining. The results of this dissertation suggest that volumetric cortical and
subcortical grey-matter can be related to behavioral reports of anxiety. Moreover, many regions
found to be related to emotion regulation are similar to those found in task-based functional
neuroimaging studies. This method is much more parsimonious and efficient than other methods
of examining the neural correlates of emotion regulation in youth. Additionally, many regions
found in the current study overlap with a study using similar methodology; relating distinct
facets of anxiety (i.e., apprehension and arousal) to cortical thickness in youth (Castagna et al.,
2017). The results also have particular relevance given the switch in positive-to-negative
connectivity between the PFC and amygdala during development (e.g., Gee et al., 2013). There
are many challenges to conducting a functional neuroimaging scan with a young child (e.g.,
excessive head movement, longer scan times, and low motivation to engage in the task). These
findings suggest that research may benefit from examining individual differences in young
children’s cortical and subcortical volumes, how they relate to emotion regulation, and how this
cortical-subcortical relationship changes over development. These findings partially support the
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overall exploratory hypothesis that the incongruent past research relating amygdala volume and
anxiety may be due to not taking into consideration the restricted variance provided by individual
differences in cortical regions that are found to be important for successful emotion regulation.
In contrast to my hypothesis, the other models of indirect effects with clusters found to be
related to right/left amygdala volume in the ipsilateral analyses were not significant, such as the
cortical areas that are within the emotion regulation network: ventral PFC, dorsal PFC, lOFC,
mOFC, and the pPL (Buhle et al. 2014; Ducharme, 2014; Gee et al., 2013; Newman et al., 2015;
Silvers et al., 2015; 2016; Wager et al. 2008).

5.4. Interaction Analyses: Amygdala Volume and Cortical Thickness
In my follow-up analyses, I looked to provide more evidence that regions involved in emotion
regulation have an indirect effect on the relationship between amygdala volume and anxiety by
demonstrating that the interaction between amygdala volume and associated cortical regions
were not predictive of self-reported anxiety. The overall aim was to demonstrate that it is
unlikely that amygdala volume has a differential effect with emotion regulation as a function of
individual differences (variance) in cortical thickness in significant areas of the PFC. I found
support for my hypotheses that these models would not be significant, which indicated that the
relationship between amygdala volume and emotion regulation did not become stronger or
weaker as a function of youth’s variability in PFC cortical thickness. Congruent with my
hypotheses, the relationship between amygdala volume and anxiety symptoms was indirectly
affected by the variance explained by cortical thickness, where the regions appear to work as a
third variable that modulates the amygdala volume and amount of anxiety reported by healthy
youth.
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5.5. Evidence for a Two-System Framework of Emotion Regulation
The overall findings were directed at exploring whether there is evidence for a two-system
framework of emotion regulation that scaffolds off of two similar theories of emotional
consciousness (LeDoux & Brown, 2017) and popular frameworks of fear/anxiety (LeDoux &
Pine, 2016). The central theoretical hypothesis was that emotional consciousness – being selfaware that you are currently in a particular emotional state (i.e., you are aware you are in a
certain emotional state) – and emotion regulation share the same underlying brain mechanisms.
In addition, it was hypothesized that the more appropriate dichotomy between non-adaptive and
adaptive emotion regulation is better captured by whether a particular emotion regulation
strategy is unconscious (type-one) and conscious (type-two), respectively. It was posited that the
differences between emotional consciousness and emotion regulation function as differences in
the recruitment of lower-order, subcortical networks and their interpretation by higher-order
structures (e.g., PFC cortical thickness).
I provide partial evidence for this hypothesis that suggest an extension of LeDoux and
Pine’s (2016) two-system framework of fear/anxiety to one of emotion regulation is feasible. I
found support for the specific circuits within the network as being type-one emotion regulation –
often called emotion reactivity/responsivity/sensitivity – and type-two emotion regulation (i.e.,
effortful strategies). The purpose of exploring LeDoux and Pine’s (2016) two-system framework
of fear/anxiety and LeDoux and Brown’s (2017) higher-order theory of consciousness was to
scaffold off dominate theories of emotional processing (i.e., LeDoux & Brown, 2017; LeDoux &
Pine, 2016) in an effort to integrate and orient these two overlapping fields.
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5.6. Results of the Theoretical Hypotheses
Although broad structures are mentioned by LeDoux et al. (2016; 2017), as shown in Figure
1.2B, the theorized neural circuits or substructures which comprise the general network of
cognitions (type one and two) are not fundamentally different than those involved in type-two
(and type-one) emotion regulation was largely supported. Briefly, a review of the literature was
congruent with my findings, supporting the notion that the GNC-2 and type-two emotion
regulation strategies heavily rely on the dlPFC, vlPFC, dmPFC cortices, as well as the dACC,
aIN, and portions of the OFC. On the other hand, I provide preliminary evidence that the GNC-1
and type-one emotion regulation may be supported by the vmPFC, portions of the OFC,
amygdala nuclei, and pIN.

5.7. The General Network of Cognition and Emotion Regulation
Hypotheses were driven by neuroimaging studies of these emotion regulation strategies (e.g.,
Otto, Misra, Prasad, & McRae 2014; Zilverstand, Parvaz, & Goldstein, 2017) map on to the
GNC outlined by Ledoux and Brown (2017), where the various strategies differ only on lowerorder, subcortical input. As seen in Figure 1.2AB, my results largely support the broader
literature, implicating the pPL, IN, ACC, and a number of areas in the PFC (i.e., ventral-lateral,
dorsal-lateral, orbital-lateral, orbital-medial, dorsal-medial, and ventral-medial). In terms of
functional neuroimaging, these same regions are involved in type-two emotion regulation
strategies such as, cognitive reappraisal (Zilverstand et al., 2017), active suppression (Goldin et
al., 2008; Wyland et al., 2003), as well as type-one regulatory processes such as the initiation of
defensive behaviors (e.g., Mogenson, Jones, & Yim, 1980), rumination (Cooney, Joormann,
Eugène Dennis, & Gotlib, 2010), and worry (Paulesu et al., 2010).
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Further evidence comes from the structural (i.e., cortical thickness, subcortical volumes)
differences (and overlap) found between self-reported anxious apprehension (largely mapping on
to type-two emotion regulation strategies such as worry) and anxious arousal (capturing type-one
defensive behaviors/changes in physiology). In line with structures comprising the GNC, anxious
apprehension, but not anxious arousal, correlated with clusters in the dlPFC, dmPFC and vlPFC,
whereas anxious arousal, but not anxious apprehension, produced clusters in the aIN and the
amygdala (Castagna et al., 2017), again, congruent with the two-system framework of
fear/anxiety (LeDoux & Pine, 2016). Interestingly, a conjunction analysis revealed the
importance of a number of frontoparietal regions with strong relationships to both systems
(Castagna et al., 2017). The overlap among the GNC and regions involved in emotion regulation,
broadly, is fairly evident; however, my aim is to extend LeDoux and Brown’s (2017) distinction
between GNC-1 and GNC-2. Support for the first hypothesis was partially provided by
demonstrating that the neural regions or substructures which comprise GNC-2 (and GNC-1) may
not fundamentally different than those involved in type-two (and type-one) emotion regulation,
given their relationship within the test of indirect effects and relationship to anxiety symptoms

5.8. The Two-System Neuroscience Framework of Fear
In brief, the two-system neuroscience framework of fear provides evidence for the
distinction and independence between the two threat systems. The first-system is thought to be
primarily subcortical (e.g., sensory system, amygdala, bed nucleus of the stria terminalis, and
striatum), leading to behavioral responses (i.e., the nucleus accumbens facilitating escape and
avoidance behaviors; Delgado, Jou, LeDoux, & Phelps, 2009; Schlund, Hudgins, Magee, &

75

Dymond, 2013) and accompany physiological changes in the brain and body – type-one,
automatic, and non-effortful, termed defensive behaviors (i.e., DFN).
The second system is posited to be an independent, higher-order cortical system that
facilitates the subjective experience of emotion depending on the subcortical input (e.g., DFN).
Specifically, they suggest that the general network of cognition (GNC), which gives rise to
perceptual (non-emotional) conscious experience (Craig, 2009; Dehaene, Changeux, Naccache,
Sackur, & Sergent, 2006; Frith & Dolan, 1996; Frifth, Perry, & Lumer, 1999; Lau &
Passingham, 2006; Naccache et al., 2002; Rees & Frith, 2007), is not fundamentally different
than the network that facilitates emotionally conscious experience; differing on lower-order,
subcortical input (e.g., DFN). The current study extends the reach of the GNC by providing
evidence of its overlap with regions important in emotion regulation (see Figure 1.2A). The
evidence I provide for the independence of the two-systems (e.g., DFN and GNC) framework
comes from a number of areas of research and parallels the distinction between type-one
(unconscious) and type-two (consciousness) emotion regulation.

5.9. The Higher-Order Theory of Consciousness (LeDoux & Brown, 2017)
LeDoux and Brown’s (2017) higher-order theory of emotional consciousness suggests
that the subcortical regions that receive primary sensory signals from the body (Damasio, 1999),
memory systems (Squire & Zola-Morgan, 1991), and the visual system (Van Essen, Anderson, &
Felleman, 1992) are all involved in the first-order representations that indirectly influence
higher-order assembly of conscious feelings by a GNC. Thus, the subjective experience of fear,
within this framework, is modulated by the DFN, along with the subcortical body sensing
network, memory, and visual systems, but directly arises from other independent higher-order
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frontoparietal networks integrating the information (i.e., the GNC). Consistent with the central
hypothesis, I found support for the same regions LeDoux and Brown (2017) posit as being
important for the two respective GNCs: a first GNC is thought to integrate subcortical input
outside of an individuals’ conscious awareness, and a second GNC that receives this input and
gives rise to the conscious experience of fear.
Taken together, the current findings largely support the notion that perceptual (nonemotional) and emotional consciousness both require the incorporation of higher-order
representation (i.e., involving cortical regions of the PFC) of lower, subcortical information (i.e.,
involving individual differences in amygdala volume) by the GNC; differences in consciousness
(non-emotional and emotional) arise from the subcortical input and higher-order representation.
Extendedly, this would suggest that LeDoux and Brown (2016) are may be correct in
hypothesizing that one can report having an emotional experience when asked (i.e., self-report
being scared), when a higher-order representation of the first higher-order representation is
created. They posit that the higher-order representations are integrated by the GNC, which fits
directly with the finding that the test of indirect effects, but not the interaction, significantly
predicted youth’s self-reported anxiety.

5.10. Limitations and Future Considerations
The sample includes a broad age range, and although age and sex were used as covariates
in all analyses, these results cannot extend to certain developmental periods. Independentsamples t-test did not indicate significant differences in younger youth (i.e., aged 10-13) and
older youth (i.e., aged 14-17) on their reporting of their anxiety symptoms, t(33) = -1.02, p > .05;
nevertheless, younger youth may still have differences in their reporting of anxiety symptoms,
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along with different cognitive and self-reflective capacity, compared to older youth, and is a
limitation of the current study. Moreover, the study was also cross-sectional, which does not
allow for a developmental course of events to be examined. The results are also derived from
typically developing youth, thus, it is unclear how this relationship might look in clinical
populations of youth. Nevertheless, the study demonstrates that amygdala grey matter volume
predicts clusters of cortical thickness grey-matter, where most clusters demonstrated significant
relationships with self-reported anxiety and significantly overlap with the larger literature on
regions important for successful emotion regulation in youth. While I attempted to control for
multiple comparisons with MCS, a limitation of the current study involves the number of
analyses conducted.
The current study has a number of strengths as well. Evidence for relating subcortical
amygdala volume with cortical thickness, while providing preliminary evidence that they are
associated due to their connectivity, is novel. Structural imaging is less burdensome than
collecting functional data, and therefore, the methodology may be beneficial to future researchers
to replicate and extend the results to younger children and adults. As previously mentioned,
functional studies may benefit from a better understanding of contralateral top-down emotion
regulation, as the results tentatively suggest that contralateral cortical regulation may be
important during the emotion generative process. This study presents a foundation in a
potentially convenient method of examine emotion regulation with structural imaging relating
cortical and subcortical grey matter, as well as proving preliminary evidence potentially
extending two major theories in the field of emotional processing (LeDoux & Brown, 2016;
LeDoux & Pine, 2017).
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